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I.

R.

HIGDON*

INTRODUCTION

In perhaps no area of the law have the first ten years of the
Burger Court had a more profound impact than in the First
Amendment's protection of the rights of journalists to gather and to
publish the news. Some have interpreted the pattern of the Burger
Court's decisions involving the media as a virtual declaration of war
by the judiciary against the press. 1 Others have viewed the same
decisions not as a restraint on press freedoms but as a thwarting of
asserted press privileges. 2 However the trend may be character
ized, the media have suffered repeated blows during the past de
cade to what they, at least, perceive to be their constitutional
rights and privileges.
If war has not been declared, hostilities have at least broken
out. They are not one-sided, and the media have at times reacted
almost hysterically as various decisions have been announced. The
enmity of the press toward the Court, however, is understandable
in view of the numerous setbacks journalists' views of the First
Amendment have undergone over the past ten years.
Most significantly, the Court has consistently refused to recog
nize any First Amendment right of the press to gather the news,
* Member of the law firm of Brown & Bain, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona; Visiting As
sistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, 1979. The
author wishes to extend special thanks to Cindy Mason for countless hours of editing
assistance.
1. Kwitny, A Judicial War on the Press?, Wall St. J., Aug. 23,1978, at 12, col. 4.
2. Commotion from the High Court?, The Quill, July-Aug. 1978, at 23, col. 1
(quoting Professor Philip Kurland).
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especially when the necessary information is in the hands of gov
ernment officials, notwithstanding the press' constitutional respon
sibility to inform the public of government activities. The Court
has refused to provide any meaningful protection for the con
fidentiality of news sources. It has exposed newsrooms to surprise
searches by police. It has drastically cut back on the constitutional
protections previously afforded the media in defamation cases. On
the other side of the ledger, however, it has blocked government
attempts to impose prior restraints on publication and to require
the publication of certain matter.
This article examines the Burger Court's most significant deci
sions in five areas relating to the gathering and disseminating of
news. 3 The analysis is principally critical. Some criticism is di
rected toward the Court for creating confusion through several
vague and imprecise decisions. Most dissatisfaction, however, de
rives from the Court's frequent failure to understand or to acknowl
edge the constitutional role of the press and the special privileges
required by the press to fulfill that role.
The implications which follow from the Burger Court's first
ten years of media law are disturbing, at least to those who believe
that the framers of the Constitution intended the freedom of the
press clause to create a special place for the media in the constitu
tional scheme. This article focuses on the future implications of the
Burger Court's media decisions.
II.

THE RIGHT OF THE PRESS

TO PUBLISH WHAT IT KNOWS

Whatever alarm the attitudes and decisions of the Burger
Court may have caused the media in other areas, the Court has at
least shown considerable reluctance to abridge the right of the
press to be free of prior governmental restraints on publication.
3. Three other important areas relating to the media, although treated by the
Burger Court in significant decisions, will not be discussed. These are: (1) the rela
tionship between the First Amendment and commercial speech (see Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)); (2) government regulation of broadcasting
(see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689 (1979); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973)); and (3) obscenity and pornography (see Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Ward v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 767 (1977); and Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978)).
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This reluctance, of course, is but a part of a tradition predating
even the First Amendment. In the eighteenth century, with de
bate raging over the extent to which freedom of the press should
be recognized, even those who argued that "improper, mischie
vous, or illegal" publications could be punished after the fact, ac
knowledged the impropriety of prior restraint on such publica
tions. 4
The subsequent debate over the scope of press freedoms has
principally concerned the government's power to censure matter
when published, not its power to restrain prior to publication. 5
While the Supreme Court has recognized that protection against
even prior restraints is not absolute, 6 it has narrowed the field of
permissible restraints to exceptional cases 7 and has insisted that
courts subject governmental prior restraints on speech to the
closest scrutiny.8 Thus, any system of prior restraint of expression
comes before the Court with a heavy presumption against its con
stitutional validity.9 The restraint must be phrased in the narrowest
terms and cannot be upheld if reasonable but less restrictive
alternatives are available;l0 and the activity restrained must pose a
clear and present danger,l1 or a serious or imminent threat to a
protected competing interest. 12

4. 5 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 151-52 (Tucker ed. 1803).
5. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15 (1931).
6. Government imposition of prior restraints is permissible when speech threat
ens to obstruct military recruiting, reveal sailing dates of transports, or the number
and location of troops. "Decency" may require restraint of obscene publications. In
citement to violence, and the overthrow of the government may likewise be sup
pressed. Id. at 716 (footnote omitted). See also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919) (some speech may lose constitutional protection during time of war if it
hinders the war effort).
7. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
8. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1975).
9. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (held state censorship
scheme, although limited to informal sanctions, unconstitutional).
10. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)
(held restraining order, banning rallies tending to disturb and endanger citizens dur
ing a period of racial turmoil unconstitutional).
11. To present a clear and present danger, the substantive evil of speech must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375, 384 (1962) (held contempt citation imposed for statement criticizing ju
dicial actions unconstitutional) (quoting Eridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941)).
.
12. The threat must be imminent, not merely likely, and the danger must cre
ate immediate peril, not be remote or even probable. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
376 (1947) (reversed journalist's conviction under contempt of court charge for pub
lishing criticisms of judicial handling of pending action).
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The first prior restraint case to reach the Burger Court was
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,13 in which Chief Justice
Burger recognized that the party seeking to sustain a prior restraint
must bear a heavy burden of justification. 14 A real estate broker
had obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting a community or
ganization from distributing literature of any kind anywhere in the
City of Westchester, Illinois. The broker argued that the organiza
tion's leaflets, critical of the broker's alleged "blockbusting" and
"panic peddling"15 activities in a neighboring community, were not
entitled to First Amendment protection because they invaded his
right of privacy and were coercive and intimidating, rather than in
formative. 16
The Court17 vacated the injunction because the heavy pre
sumption against the constitutional validity of any prior restraint on
publication had not been overcome. 18 Near v. Minnesota 19 held
that prior restraints of publications concerning the malfeasance of
public officers violate the First Amendment. Similarly, the Keefe
Court could find no authority supporting the use of a court's
injunctive power to protect an individual from public criticism of
his business practices. 2o Against this backdrop, several more signif
icant prior restraint cases were decided by the Burger Court.
A.

"Gag" Orders in Criminal Proceedings

In Sheppard v. Maxwell,21 the Warren Court reversed a mur
der conviction on the ground that the defendant had not been
given a fair trial. This conclusion had two bases. First, the trial
judge had permitted the case to be tried in a "carnival atmos
phere, "22 with newsmen hounding participants and disrupting the
trial by their movement in and out of the courtroom. 23 Second, the
record convinced the Court that the deluge of publicity emanating
13. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
14. ld. at 419.
15. Respondent's activities allegedly were intended to arouse fear in local
white residents that Blacks planned to move into the area, causing the white resi
dents to sell their property and allowing the real estate broker to seC1,lre listings. [d.
at 416.
16. Id. at 418.
17. Justice Harlan dissented on procedural grounds. [d. at 420-23.
18. [d. at 419.
19. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
20. 402 U.S. at 419.
21. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
22. [d. at 358.
23. Id. at 355.
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from the proceedings had reached at least some members of the
jury.24 The Court was particularly concerned because these news
accounts included charges about the defendant not raised in the
trial, journalists' interpretations of the evidence and a "doctored"
front-page photograph. 25
The Court severely criticized the trial judge's failure to main
tain control of the publicity of the trial. It specifically suggested
that the trial court should have insulated the witnesses from press
accounts of other witnesses' testimony and other witnesses' out-of
court statements. Moreover, some effort should have been made
"to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the
press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both
sides. "26 Citing the right of the accused to a trial by an impartial
jury free from outside influences, the Court suggested additional
measures to curb the impact of publicity on the jury, including
continuing the case until the threat of prejudice abated or
transferring the case to another county not so inundated with pub
licity.27 Missing from the Court's lengthy list of judicial powers to
nullify prejudicial publicity was perhaps the most expeditious
method, direct restraints on what might be published. The Court
specifically stated that nothing proscribed the press from reporting
events that transpired in the courtroom. 28
That possibility was raised six years later in Branzburg v.
Hayes,29 a case not involving prejudicial publicity, where the
Burger Court suggested in dictum the validity of gag orders in
criminal proceedings to protect the rights of the accused. Journal
ists, the Court said, could be prevented from "attending or pub
lishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to
assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. "30
The result was swift, undeniable and, perhaps, predictable:

24. ld. at 357.
25. ld.
26. ld. at 359.
27. ld. at 361-63. In addition, the judge should have raised sequestration of the
jury sua sponte with counsel.
28. ld. at 362-63.
29. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
30. ld. at 685 (emphasis added). The Burger Court's subsequent treatment of
the power of the courts to bar the attendance of journalists at criminal proceedings
will be discussed below in connection with Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct.
2898 (1979). As will further be discussed below, this was not the only troublesome
dictum to come out of the Branzburg opinion. See notes 179-206 infra and accompa
nying text.
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courts allover the country began issuing gag orders. From 1967
through 1973 twelve such orders were reported. There were
thirteen in 1974 alone, fourteen in 1975 and eleven in the first six
months of 1976. 31 One such order, which had been imposed in a
Nebraska murder case, was challenged in Nebraska Press Associa
tion v. Stuart. 32 The Supreme Court agreed to review this decision
which concerned the prosecution of Erwin Charles Simants for the
murder of six members of a family in Sutherland, Nebraska, on the
night of October 18, 1975. The crime had attracted widespread
news coverage by local, regional, and national newspapers and by
radio and television stations. 33 The day before Simants' preliminary
hearing, and three days after the crime, the prosecutor and
Simants' attorney joined in asking the county court to enter an or
der restricting what could be disclosed by the press to the public
about the case. Following oral argument on the request, in which
no representative of the press participated through counsel, the
county court issued an order prohibiting everyone in attendance
from releasing any testimony given at the preliminary hearing. 34
The preliminary hearing was opened to the public and the press,
but subject to the order.
Several representatives of the media went to state district
court, where Simants was to be tried, asking that the county court
order be vacated. The district court instead issued a restrictive or
der of its own, applicable only until the jury was impaneled, specif
ically prohibiting the press from reporting on five specific sub
jects35 and from reporting the exact nature of the order itself.
The Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to vacate the district
court's order. In an attempt to accommodate Simants' right to a fair
trial and the media's interest in reporting pretrial events, the
Nebraska Supreme Court modified the county court's ruling and
limited the scope of the gag to three matters.36 It refused, how
31. Friendly, Murder in Nebraska, Dateline 4, 9 (1977).
32. 194 Neb. 783,236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
33. 427 U.S. at 542.
34. Id.
35. The five subjects were: (1) Simants' confession to law enforcement officers;
(2) Simants' statements to other persons; (3) the contents of a note he had written the
night of the crime; (4) medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; (5) the identity
of the victims of Simants' sexual assault. Id. at 543-44.
36. The three matters subject to the gag order were: (1) any confessions or ad
missions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers; (2) any confessions or
admissions made to any third parties, except members of the press; and (3) other
facts "strongly implicative" of the accused. 427 U.S. at 545.
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ever, to adopt an "absolutist position" that would bar a gag of any
kind. 37
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari38 to con
sider the important issues raised by the district court order as
modified by the Nebraska Supreme Court, but it refused to expe
dite review or to stay the orders entirely, pending Simants' trial.
In the interim between the granting of certiorari and the Supreme
Court's decision, Simants was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death. 39
The decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court was reversed,
the Justices unanimously holding that the prior restraints imposed
by the Nebraska order had not been justified constitutionally. The
point of departure for the Justices was whether prior restraints
could ever be justified in this context.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in which Justices
Stewart and Marshall joined, recognized that while the right to a
fair trial by a jury of one's peers is one of the most precious and sa
cred safeguards within the Bill of Rights, prior restraints on free
dom of the press are a constitutionally impermissible means of
enforcing that right. Rather, alternative, less intrusive techniques
exist to guarantee the accused a fair trial. 40 Because Justice
Brennan believed the trial courts possess adequate tools other than
injunctions against reporting to assure Sixth Amendment rights, he
rejected the notion that there is an inherent conflict between free
speech and the right to a fair trial, and that to uphold one right re
quires the exclusion of the other. 41 Justice Brennan also cited prac
tical reasons for not permitting prior restraints in this context.
First, the potential for .subjective judicial censorship would exist
and would be exacerbated by the fact that judges might, in some
cases, be required to rule on whether material regarding their own
competence, integrity, or general performance on the bench
should be published. 42 In addition, there would be procedural dif
37. 194 Neb. at 797,236 N.W.2d at 804.
38. 423 U.S. 1027 (1975).
39. 427 U.S. at 546. The Court nevertheless concluded that the controversy was
not moot because the dispute was" 'capable of repetition.' .. Id.
40. Id. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 612. Among the tools listed by Justice Brennan were: (1) Sequestra
tion of jurors and control over the courtroom and conduct of the trial; (2) the
stemming of much of the flow of prejudicial publicity at its source, before it is ob
tained by the press; (3) voir dire probing fully into the effect of publicity on prospec
tive jurors; (4) a brief continuance of the trial to attenuate the impact of publicity;
and (5) the granting of a change of venue if necessary. Id. at 601.
42. Id. at 607.
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ficulties associated with any attempt to impose prior restraints on
publication of information relating to pending criminal proceed
ings,43 and an inevitable overuse of the technique44 that would
lead to profuse litigation substantially burdening the media. The fi
nancial disincentives of such litigation, Justice Brennan argued,
would deter the media from seeking relief and would create the
distinct possibility that many erroneous impositions would go un
corrected. 45
In a separate concurring opinion,46 Justice White expressed
doubt that restraints on the press such as were entered in this case
would ever be justifiable, but agreed that it may have been pru
dent not to announce such a rule in the first case in which the is
sue was squarely presented to the Court. According to Justice
White, a general rule should issue only after the courts have re
ceived broader exposure to prior restraint cases and have reached
similar recurring results.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, subscribed to Just
ice Brennan's approach and announced that he would probably
reach the same conclusion as Justice Brennan when squarely faced
with a prior restraint case. 47 That conclusion, he said, could not be
reached without considering whether absolute protection would ap
ply if the information sought to be published was obtained in a
shabby or illegal manner or by intrusion on privacy, or was false,
prejudicial, or published with a perverse motive. 48 Adoption of
Justice Brennan's view by Justice Stevens, then, would require fur
ther argument on the issue of absolute protection. 49
In any event, a majority of the Justices either announced in
Stuart a willingness to adopt an absolute prohibition of prior re
straints on publication of information about criminal proceedings or
left that possibility open for consideration in a subsequent case.
The remaining Justices, however, believed that such prior re
straints could be permissible, if only in certain limited circum
stances.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, declared his view
that a prior restraint may issue only when it is necessary to prevent
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

49.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6U.
Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring).
See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
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the dissemination of prejudicial publicity that is likely to interfere
with the impaneling of a jury meeting the Sixth Amendment re
quirement of impartiality. 50
The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, also re
jected Justice Brennan's absolutist approach. The ChiefJustice reit
erated the Court's position that First Amendment rights are not
absolute and went on to say that a showing of substantial threat to
fair trial rights could justify restraint. 51 For the plurality, then, it
was necessary to review the record that led to the Nebraska Su
preme Court's gag order to determine whether the prior restraint
was justifiably imposed. In so doing, the plurality remarked that
"the barriers to prior restraint remain high, "52 describing such re
straint as an extraordinary remedy in our jurisprudence. 53 The plu
rality based its conclusion that the Nebraska Supreme Court's or
der was constitutionally invalid on a number of considerations.
First, although the plurality was persuaded that the Simants
case would receive intense and pervasive pretrial publicity which
the trial court could reasonably conclude would impair the defen
dant's right to a fair trial, such a conclusion was at best speculative,
being founded on factors unknown and unknowable. 54
Second, the plurality noted that there was no finding that
alternative measures would have inadequately protected Simants'
rights. The Nebraska Supreme Court did no more than imply that
other less intrusive measures might have failed to protect Simants'
rights. 55 For specific alternatives that could have been considered,
the plurality cited Sheppard. 56
,
Third, the plurality believed that the orders of the Nebraska
courts would be inefficacious in view of the attention the Simants
case received nationally and the territorial limitations on the
Nebraska courts' jurisdiction. There also existed the problem of
trying to determine in advance what information would be prejudi
cial. Information that was not restricted because it did not appear
to be potentially prejudicial to the defendant could emerge through
50. This requires a showing that "(i) there is a clear threat to the fairness of
trial, (ii) such a threat is posed by the actual publicity to be restrained, and (iii) no
less restrictive alternatives are available." ld. at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 569-70.
52. ld. at 570.
53. Id. at 562.
54. ld. at 563.
55. Id. at 565.
56. 384 U.S. 333, 361-62 (1966). See notes 26 & 27 supra and accompanying
text.
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publication and be damaging. 57 Illustratively, each of the three
Nebraska courts had developed a different list of subject matter
that would be prejudicial to Simants' rights. The plurality also cited
the anomaly of permitting a small community's rumor mills to func
tion unabated while shutting down reasonably accurate news ac
counts. 58
In addition, to the extent that the gag orders prohibited the
reporting of evidence adduced at the open preliminary hearing,
they violated the settled principle that nothing can prevent the
press from reporting on events that transpire in the courtroom. 59
Once a public hearing has been held, the events that took place
there cannot be subjected to prior restraint. 60 Finally, the
Nebraska Supreme Court's order, to the extent it prohibited publi
cation of "implicative" information, was found by the plurality to
be too vague and too broad to survive the close scrutiny the Court
gives restraints on First Amendment rights. 61
Despite the unanimity of the Court's decision in Stuart, gen
eralizations about the case are hard to make, and guidelines for the
future are not easy to develop since five Justices filed separate
opinions and no more than three Justices subscribed to anyone of
them. For example, while only four Justices rejected the "absolu
tist" approach for all time, they did so vehemently. Furthermore,
it is quite possible to imagine a case involving "shabby" and "ille
gal" means of obtaining information, serious intrusions of privacy
and so forth, that might cause Justice Stevens to abandon his an
nounced inclination toward an "absolutist" approach. 62
Even the lack of dissent from the view that the press may not
be restrained from publishing what comes out in public criminal
proceedings63 opened up another can of worms. The plurality in
57. 427 U.S. at 567.
58. Id.
59. ld. at 568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362-63).
60. 427 U.S. at 568.
61. ld.
62. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
63. IiI a similar case, the Supreme Court first stayed and then summarily re
versed in an order by a state court judge in a juvenile proceeding that the press not
publish the name of an eleven year old boy accused of homicide. Oklahoma Pub
lishing Co. v. District Court, 429 U.S. 967 (1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). The
boy's identity had been disclosed earlier during an open hearing and the Court held
that the First Amendment "will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of
widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact
open to the public." 430 U.S. at 310. That the trial court judge had not expressly or
dered the hearing to be public made no difference because the presiding judge, the
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Stuart referred without comment to the statement by the Nebraska
Supreme Court that, under Nebraska law, the preliminary hearing
could have been closed to the public, including the press. A major
ity of the Justices have since held that nothing in the First Amend
ment prevents such closure,64 a decision that has been interpreted
in some state courts as applicable not only to preliminary hearings
but also to criminal trials. 65 The vexing problem of media access to
information not produced in the courtroom also remains, and it,
too, will be discussed below.
In any event, Stuart indicates that the Burger Court means
what it says about the barriers to prior restraint remaining high.
Nothing in the various opinions indicates that they soon will be
lowered by this Court. For that, at least, the press may be grate
ful.

B.

Statutes Requiring Confidentiality of Proceedings

In each of the last two terms, the Burger Court has reviewed
state statutes making it a crime for members of the press to divulge
to the public information about certain proceedings. On each occa
sion, the Court has found the statute constitutionally improper.
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia 66 involved a
Virginia statute creating the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission 67 to investigate charges of judicial improprieties. Pur
suant to a state constitutional provision which required the creation
of such a commission and which required the confidentiality of pro
ceedings before the commission,68 the statute provided that all
"papers filed with and proceedings before the Commission . . .
including the identification of the subject judge as well as all testi
mony and other evidence" given to the Commission was not to be
divulged "by any person to anyone except the Commission" until
the filing of a formal, complaint with the Virginia Supreme
Court. 69 Moreover, it was a misdemeanor for any person to divulge
information in violation of the statute. 70
prosecutor, and the defense counsel all knew that members of the press were in fact
present and no objection was raised. [d. at 31l.
64. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979). For a discussion of
Gannett see notes 179-206 infra and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 MED. L. RPTR. 1545
(Va.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 204 (1979).
66. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
67. Hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
68. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 10.
69. VA. CODE §§ 2.1-37.13 (1973).
70. [d.
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Notwithstanding these prohibitions, the Virginia Pilot, a news
paper owned by Landmark Communications, published an article
accurately reporting on a pending inquiry by the Commission and
identifying the judge being investigated. The newspaper was prose
cuted under the confidentiality statute, found guilty, and fined five
hundred dollars. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the convic
tion and fine, holding that premature disclosure of the Commis
sion's sensitive proceedings posed a clear and present danger to
the state's legitimate interests in the effective discharge of the
Commission's purpose and to the orderly administration of just
ice. 71
The Burger Court, reversing, noted that forty-seven states,
the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had all established some
type of judicial inquiry and disciplinary procedures, and that only
Puerto Rico did not provide for the confidentiality of judicial disci
plinary proceedings in some way. The Court willingly accepted
"the collective judgment that confidentiality promotes the effective
ness of this mode of scrutinizing judicial conduct and integrity,"
but considered this "only the beginning of the inquiry."72 The is
sue, as the Court saw it, was not the validity of a confidentiality re
quirement, but rather, whether the divulging or publishing of in
formation concerning the work of the Commission by third parties,
including the media, could be criminally punishable. 73
The Court unanimously held 74 that the media could not be
criminally punished for divulging information about the Commis
sion's work. While willing to assume that confidentiality of the
Commission's proceedings served legitimate state interests, it
71. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. 699, 233 S.E.2d 120
(1977). The Virginia court identified three functions served by the requirement of
confidentiality in the commission's proceedings: (1) Protection of the j~dge's reputa
tion from the adverse publicity that might flow from frivolous complaints; (2) mainte
nance of confidence in the judicial system by preventing the premature disclosure of
a complaint before the commission had determined that the charge was well
founded; and (3) protection of complainants and witnesses from possible recrimina
tion by prohibiting disclosure until the validity of the complaint had been ascer
tained. Id. at 712, 233 S.E.2d at 128-29.
72. 435 U.S. at 836.
73. Indeed, while the "collective judgment" favored confidentiality provisions,
only Hawaii, in addition to Virginia, provided criminal sanctions for disclosure. Id. at
836-37.
74. Neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Powell participated in the decision.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was that, while Virginia could not extend its law
to punish the media, it was not constitutionally prohibited from punishing other
third parties who violated the confidentiality provisions. Id. at 849. The implications
of driving this wedge between free press and free speech were not discussed.
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found nothing in the record beyond assertion and conjecture to
support the contention that without criminal sanctions these inter
ests would be undermined. The majority questioned the relevance
of the clear and present danger standard to the case and rejected
what it termed a mechanical application of the standard by the
Virginia Supreme Court amounting to nothing more than deference
to legislation. 75
The thrust of the majority's opinion was that the Virginia Pilot
newspaper article, in providing accurate factual information about
the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation, had
served the First Amendment's aim of promoting discussion of gov
ernmental affairs 76 while the State of Virginia had failed to justify
its attempted encroachment on that constitutionally protected ac
tivity.
While Landmark Communications has been hailed by the me
dia as one of its few victories in the Burger Court in recent days,77
the decision is not without disturbing features for the press. For
example, Landmark Communications urged that "truthful reporting
about public officials in connection with their public duties is al
ways insulated from the imposition of criminal sanctions by the
First Amendment. "78 One might have thought that this was almost
a black letter law proposition, especially since Landmark Commu
nications was able to cite, in its support, cases according constitu
tional protection to untruthful speech about public officials 79 and to
the dissemination of truthful commercial information. 8o But the
Court treated the proposal as if it represented some startling new
jump that should not be taken precipitously: "We find it unneces
sary to adopt this categorical approach to resolve the issue before
us. "81 It can only be /hoped that we never find out in what circum
stances criminal sanctions can be imposed for truthful reporting
about public officials in connection with their public duties.
The majority also concurred with the Virginia Supreme Court
that the statute before it did "not constitute a prior restraint or at
tempt by the State to censor the news media."82 No one ques
75.
76.
77.
Nov. 13,
78.
79.
80.
Council,
81.
82.

ld. at 842-43.
ld. at 839.
See, e.g., Press hoping for improved court record, Publisher's Auxiliary,
1978, at 1, col. 1.
435 U.S. at 838.
See, .e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
435 U.S. at 838.
ld.
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tioned in Stuart that an order by a judge not to publish certain in
formation, enforced with the threat of jail for contempt of court, is
a prior restraint and attempt to censor. Somehow, however, legis
lative directives with similar provisions and enforcement mecha
nisms are not viewed as prior restraints or attempts at censorship,
though they produce, at least as a practical matter, the same re
sult. 83 But if different standards are to be used to determine the
validity of prior restraints and subsequent punishments, a point not
addressed in Landmark Communications, the distinction is not
without a difference. Unfortunately, when the Court had the op
portunity a year later to recognize that court injunctions and prohi
bition statutes operate with the same prior restraint effect and
should, therefore, be treated alike, it declined to do so.
That opportunity came when the Supreme Court reviewed an
other statute intended to prevent the publication of information
relating to judicial proceedings. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
CO.84 involved a West Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor for
the name of a juvenile connected with juvenile proceedings to "be
published in any newspaper without a written order of the court
. . . . "85 Two newspapers were indicted under the statute after
publishing the name of a juvenile allegedly responsible for killing a
fellow junior high school student on the school grounds. The news
papers had obtained the alleged assailant's name from various
witnesses, the police and an assistant prosecuting attorney who
were at the school. 86 The Charleston Daily Mail elected to omit
the name in its first story on the incident because of the statutory
prohibition; but the Charleston Daily Gazette, having made a dif
ferent editorial decision, identified the juvenile the following morn
ing. By that afternoon, at least three radio stations had carried the
juvenile's name on various broadcasts; and the Daily Mail,
believing that the information had by then become public knowl
edge, published the name in its follow-up story on the killing.
Following their indictments for violating the statute, the two
newspapers sought and obtained from the state supreme court an
order prohibiting county officials from taking any action on the in
dictments. The West Virginia Supreme Court held that the statute
operated as a prior restraint on speech and that the state's interest
in protecting the identity of the juvenile offender did not overcome
83.
84.
85.
86.

See note 129 infra.
99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976).
99 S. Ct. at 2669.
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the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such prior
restraints. 87
When the case reached the Burger Court on certiorari, the
newspapers first asked for a ruling that the West Virginia statute,
while not a typical prior restraint, that is, a prior injunction against
publication, nonetheless acted in "operation and effect" as another
form of prior restraint. 88 The Burger Court, however, declined the
invitation, preferring instead to retain the distinction between prior
restraints and statutes attempting to punish publication after the
event. 89 Thus, the "operation and effect" argument was not given
its deserved recognition, and the Court continued to give the im
pression that prohibition statutes are to be judged less harshly than
judicial injunctions although the practical effect, as witnessed by
the Charleston Daily Mail's initial editorial decision not to publish
the juvenile's name, is the same.
The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to declare the West
Virginia statute a prior restraint because, even under the appar
ently lesser standards by which prohibition statutes are now
judged,90 it could be stricken as deficient. West Virginia's interest
in protecting the anonymity of a juvenile offender to further his re
habilitation was found in sufficient to warrant punishment of news
papers for publishing truthful information about a matter of public
significance. 91 Moreover, even assuming the statute served a note
87. State ex rei. Daily Mail Publishing Co. v. Smith, 248 S.E.2d 269 (w. Va.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
88. 99 S. Ct. at 2670. The newspapers, perhaps recognizing the politics of the
situation, argued that the statute constituted a prior restraint only because of the
need to apply to the judge for permission to publish the name. They were obviously
stretching matters in an effort to make the prohibition more judicial than legislative,
and thus more like a "classic" prior restraint. A more direct approach would have
been a frontal assault on the judicial-legislative distinction.
89. Id. Prior restraints are accorded the most exacting scrutiny while punish
ment after publication must be merely necessary to further a state interest.
90. In fairness, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion does state that a crimi
nal prohibition statute "requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its valid
ity." Id. This does not, however, dispel the clear impression that such statutes are
judged by a different, and lesser, standard than prior restraints by judicial injunction.
91. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974), in which similar interests were advanced by the state to justify pro
hibiting criminal defendants from impeaching prosecution witnesses on the basis of
their juvenile records. Id. at 2671. It was declared that the state's policy must be
subordinated to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Finding the
First Amendment right of publication to be of equal weight to the Sixth Amendment
confrontation right, Chief Justice Burger concluded that the state's interest in juve
nile offender anonymity must give way here as well. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. at 319).
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worthy state interest, it did not accomplish its stated purpose be
cause it prohibited only newspaper dissemination. Broadcasters
could, and did, publish the information with impunity.92 Finally,
the majority noted that, while all fifty states provide in some way
for confidentiality in judicial proceedings, only five imposed crimi
nal penalties on nonparties for identifying juveniles, indicating that
most states have found alternative means of accomplishing the ob
jective of protecting juveniles identities. 93
In addition to refusing to recognize the West Virginia statute
as a prior restraint, the majority opinion gave the media occasion
for pause by going out of its way to explain how narrow its holding
was:
There is no issue before us of unlawful press access to con
fidential judicial proceedings . . . ; there is no issue here of pri
vacy or prejudicial pretrial publicity. At issue is simply the
power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged
juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper.
The asserted state interest cannot justify the statute's imposition
of criminal sanctions on' this type of publication. 94

C.

Injunctions in the Name of "National Security"

While the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the
barriers to prior restraints are high,95 it has with equal consistency
recognized at least certain categories of publications where the bar
riers may be overcome upon a proper showing of justification. For
example, the requirement of "decency" may be enforced96 by pre
92. 99 S. Ct. at 2672. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result because he
agreed that the West Virginia statute, by permitting the names of juvenile offenders
to be broadcast, did not accomplish its purpose. He disagreed, however, with the
majority's conclusion that protecting juveniles in this type of case was not an interest
of the "highest order." He argued that such an interest "far outweighs any minimal
interference with freedom of the press ...." Id. at 2673 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
93. ld. at 2672 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978)). Justice Rehnquist was not impressed:
Even if the juvenile court's proceedings and records are closed to the pub
lic, the press still will be able to obtain the child's name in the same man
ner as it was acquired in this case. Thus, the Court's reference to effective
alternatives for accomplishing the State's goals is a mere chimera. The fact
that other States do not punish publication of the names of juvenile offend
ers, while relevant, certainly is not determinative of the requirements of the
Constitution.
Id. at 2674 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citation to record omitted).
94. ld. at 2672.
95. See notes 6-12 supra and accompanying text.
96. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 716.
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venting, as well as by punishing, the publication of "the lewd and
obscene, [and] the profane . . . ,"97 and community security may
be protected by restraining incitements to acts of violence and the
overthrow by force of orderly government. 98 The rationale for the
special treatment of these narrowly limited classes of speech in
prior restraint analysis traditionally has been that lewd, obscene,
profane and inciteful types of speech are of only slight social value,
are not essential to the exposition of ideas, and are clearly out
weighed by society's interest in order and morality. 99
For very different reasons, the Court has also left the door
open to the possibility of prior restraints in times of war. Certain
speech tolerated during times of peace may be of such hindrance
to a war effort that it loses its constitutional protection during times
of war. 100 Thus, the government may prevent obstruction of its re
cruiting service and the publication of the sailing dates of trans
ports or the number and location of troops. 101 The Court's unstated
purpose in recognizing this special class of speech was promotion of
national security. The questions of how much restraint "national se
curity" could justify, and of how directly speech must relate to a
war effort for it to trigger a governmental right to prevent its publi
cation were largely of academic interest until 1971.
Legal scholars may differ as to whether the United States was
"at war" in 1971 because no formal declaration of war against North
Vietnam had been made by Congress; and politicians may disagree
as to whether the Vietnam conflict really involved matters of na
tional security, but American troops were certainly fighting and dy
ing in Southeast Asia. The Nixon Administration was convinced
that publication by The New York Times, the Washington Post and
others of Daniel Ellsberg's "Pentagon Papers" would endanger its
"war" effort and would be otherwise detrimental to "national secu
rity." For that reason, the United States Government, apparently
for the first time, sought to enjoin newspapers from publishing in
formation in their possession. 102
97. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
98. 283 U.S. at 716.
99. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). The class of
"libelous" speech was also included among those less protected in the Chaplinsky
formulation under the same rationale. Id. It has since been held that even some li
belous statements are entitled to full, if not absolute, constitutional protection. See
notes 356-82 infra and accompanying text.
100. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
101. 283 U.S. at 716.
102. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
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The case, New Yark Times Co. v. United States, 103 did not fit
neatly into previous Court dicta. Publication of the "Pentagon Pa
pers" did not involve direct obstruction of recruitment or revela
tion of numbers or locations of troops. The majority viewed publi
cation as courageous reporting which served the First Amendment
purpose of revealing the workings of government. 104 The counter
balancing fear, expressed by Justice Blackmun in dissent, was that
publication ofthe "Pentagon Papers" might also result in" 'the death of
soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty
of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to
negotiate' [and the] prolongation of the war and of further delay in
the freeing of United States prisoners .... "105
Whether such results might, in another case, be sufficient to
warrant a prior restraint was not decided. Six Justices voted to dis
miss the government's complaint, but they could only agree to a
brief per curiam opinion that the government had not met its
heavy burden of showing justification for prior restraint in this
case. All nine Justices filed separate opinions; combining them to
form generalizations or to find guidance in future cases yields few
meaningful results.
Justices Black and Douglas maintained their absolutist posi
tions, arguing that the First Amendment permits no prior re
straints in any circumstances. lOS Justice Brennan would not go that
far, but believed that the Near and Schenck v. United States 107
dicta covered the field of what may be properly enjoined: "[O]nly
governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably,
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred
to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support
even the issuance of an interim restraining order. "108 Because the
103. Id. at 713.
104. Id. at 717.
105. Id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. "[Ilt is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently willing to
hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would
make a shambles of the First Amendment." Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring). Justice
Black would not recognize an exception even for "national security." Id. at 719.
Justice Douglas expressed the similar view that the First Amendment "leaves
... no room for governmental restraint on the press." Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concur
ring). He viewed Near as a direct repudiation of the "expansive" view that the gov
ernment has the inherent power to go into court and obtain an injunction to protect
the national interest. Id. at 723. He considered the dominant purpose of the First
Amendment to be the prohibition of the government's widespread practice of sup
pression of embarrassing information. Id. at 723-24.
107. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
108. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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government had failed at every step to make out such a case, Just
ice Brennan believed that each restraint that had been issued
violated the First Amendment, even if its purpose had been to af
ford the courts an opportunity to examine the claim more thor
oughly.I09
Justice Stewart expressed the view that the President alone
should determine which internal security measures are necessary
to maintain effectiveness in executing the Executive's power to
conduct foreign affairs and to maintain a national defense. Though
Justice Stewart announced that he was convinced that the Execu
tive was correct with respect to some of the documents involved,
he nevertheless joined with the majority because he could not say
that disclosure of any of the documents would surely result in di
rect, immediate, and irreparable damage to the nation or its peo
ple. 110
Justice White was confident that revelation of the documents
would do substantial damage to public interests, but voted against
the injunctions sought· by the government because it had not
satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an in
junction against publication. He would not, however, proscribe in
junctions against publishing information about government plans or
operations in all circumstances. 111 Justice White then noted provi
sions of the Criminal Code that he believed were relevan t to this
case. The sections he discussed make it a crime to publish certain
photographs or drawings of military installations,112 proscribe pub
lication of certain classmed information,113 and prohibit the willful
communication of documents relating to the national defense to
one not entitled to receive them. 114 Should the "Pentagon Papers"
be published and any materials within the book violate these statu
tory prohibitions, Justice White suggested that he would sustain
the publisher's conviction under the Criminal Code even though a
prior restraint could not justifiably be imposed on the writings. 115
The final Justice to vote with the majority, Justice Marshall,
came to his decision from yet another direction. Feeling compelled
109. Id. at 727.
110. Id. at 729-30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 797 (1976).
113. Id. § 798(a).
114. Id. § 793(e).
115. 403 U.S. at 735, 736-37 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion analyzed the same statutory provisions and found no relevance therein to
these publications. Id. at 720-22.
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to uphold the concept of separation of powers, he refused to pre
vent behavior which Congress had specifically declined to pro
hibit. 116 Justice Marshall also believed that the government had
failed to establish that the criminal statutes referred to by Justice
White did not provide an adequate remedy at law so as to require
equitable relief. 117
The dissenters' reasons for their votes were also varied. Chief
Justice Burger simply announced that the "unseemly haste" with
which the cases were conducted left him unprepared to reach the
merits.1 18 The Chief Justice said he generally agreed with the
views of the other dissenters, but the only solid clue to his ulti
mate position was his rejection of the view of the "First Amend
ment as an absolute in all circumstances."119 While Justice Black
had argued that "every moment's continuance of the injunctions
against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and
continuing violation of the First Amendment,"120 Chief Justice
Burger argued that the newspapers could not complain of any addi
tional delay of publication that full adjudication might necessitate
since the newspapers themselves had delayed publication for
months after receiving the documents. 121
The Chief Justice also chided the newspapers for failing to
perform their basic duty as citizens with respect to the discovery or
possession of stolen property or secret government documents,
namely, "to give the government an opportunity to review the en
tire collection" and to determine whether agreement could be
reached on publication. 122 The Chief Justice announced that he
would have ordered a stay of publication until the trial courts had
had the opportunity to make a full determination of the merits. 123
Justice Harlan also complained of the haste in the proceed
ings, but felt nevertheless forced to reach the merits of the case.
His dissent was based upon a belief in a limited scope of judicial
review in cases of this sort and a general deference to the Execu
116. Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 743-44.
118. Id. at 748, 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The prompt settling of these
cases reflects our universal abhorrence of prior restraint. But prompt judicial action
does not mean unjudicial haste." Id. at 749.
119. Id. at 748, 752.
120. Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 750, 751.
123. Id. at 752. He added his "general agreement" to Justice White's views on
the potential applicability of the penal statutes. Id.
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tive in determining matters of national security. The courts, he
said, may not properly go beyond two specific inquiries: First,
whether the subject matter of the dispute lay within the President's
foreign relations power; and second, whether the head of the Exec
utive Department concerned personally determined that disclosure
of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national secu
rity.124 Justice Harlan would have continued the restraints on pub
lication pending "further hearings in each case conducted under
the appropriate ground rules. "125
Finally, Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Harlan's analysis
and embraced much of what Justice White had said concerning
possible criminal liability after the fact of publication. 126 He added
his concern for the possible results of publication 127 and stated
that, if such results should come about, "then the Nation's people
will know where the responsibility for these sad consequences
rests. "128
The ultimate result was that the Times, the Post and others
eventually published the "Pentagon Papers," but the Court's wide
diversity of opinions left little guidance for the future. Only two
Justices, Black and Douglas, expressed the view that the First
Amendment absolutely prohibits prior restraints in this area, and
they no longer sit on the Court. Except for Justice Harlan's scope
of review approach, none of the remaining Justices provided much
in the way of guidelines for determining the validity of attempted
prior restraints in national security cases.
Five Justices discussed the criminal sanctions against
communicating certain information but could not agree on the im
plications of those statutes for this case. Justice Douglas believed
that the criminal statutes indicated no intention by Congress that
publication of documents relating to national security be either en
joined or punished. Justices White and Marshall believed that the
statutes could lead to punishment after the fact of publication. Just
ice Marshall, however, felt that Congress' decision that certain
communications could be punished without providing for pre
publication injunctions ended any question of prior restraint. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, however, saw no barriers to
prior restraint imposed by the statutes and viewed the punish
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 758-59.
Id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying note 105 supra.
403 U.S. at 763 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ments provided therein simply as additional inducements not to
publish. None of the Justices discussing the penal statutes ap
peared to have any problem with their First Amendment implica
tions. 129
An opportunity for further refinement of the law of prior re
straints based upon national security claims has been aborted. On
March 26, 1979, district court Judge Robert W. Warren issued, at
the request of the government, an injunction prohibiting the maga
zine The Progressive from publishing an article, The H-Bomb Se
cret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It.1 30 The Judge con
cluded that the article, while probably not providing a
"do-it-yourself" guide for making a hydrogen bomb, could assist a
medium-sized nation in developing such a weapon more quickly.131
While The Progressive argued that all the data contained in the ar
ticle was in the public domain and readily available to any diligent
seeker, Judge Warren was convinced that the article set forth con
cepts vital to the operation of the hydrogen bomb which were not
available to the general public. 132
The district court distinguished the "Pentagon Papers" cases
on three grounds: First, the Pentagon cases dealt with purely his
torical data; second, the government in the "Pentagon Papers"
cases had advanced no cogent reasons as to what effect the article
had on the national security interest, except that publication might
cause the United States some embarrassment; and third, the most
vital difference, the hydrogen bomb case involved a specific stat
ute 133 prohibiting publication of the material in question. 134
Judge Warren viewed his task as one of weighing the merits
and consequences of the two divergent views before him, injunc
tion or publication: "A mistake in ruling against The Progressive
will seriously infringe on cherished First Amendment rights. . . .
A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the
way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our
right to life is extinguished and the right to publish becomes
moot. "135 The district court imposed an injunction based on the
129. It has been argued, for example, that "Times-style injunctions may induce
less self-censorship than criminal sanctions." Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 209 (1971).
130. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
131. Id. at 993.
132. Id.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b) (1976).
134. 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (WD. Wis. 1979).
135. Id. at 996.
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following findings: The hydrogen bomb article was sufficiently anal
ogous to the publication of troop movements in 1931 to warrant a
prior restraint under the Near dicta; the government had met its
heavy burden of justification for such a restraint; and restraining
publication of the objectionable technical portions of the article
would not impede the development of public knowledge or the na
tional debate on national policy questions. 136
The Supreme Court refused to expedite The Progressive's ap
137
peal
and never had the opportunity to review the district court's
injunction or to refine the law of prior restraints in the national se
.. curity area through this case. In September 1979, before the court
6fappeals ruled on The Progressive's appeal, the Justice Depart
ment dropped the case after material from The Progressive article
was published elsewhere, despite the government's efforts to block
publication. 138
III.

THE PRESS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION

If the Burger Court has been reasonably solicitous of the right
of the media to publish what it knows, it has been downright nig
gardly in recognizing any right of the press to find out anything. It
suggested in dicta that news gathering qualified for First Amend
ment protection and that some protection for seeking out the news
was crucial to upholding freedom of the press. 139 But the position
of the Burger Court, as applied in practice, has been closer to that
first independently expressed by Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart
maintained that the constitutional guarantee of a free press created
a fourth institution outside the government which provided an ad
ditional check on the three official branches. 140 He explained that,
although the autonomous press may publish what it knows and may
136. Judge Warren acknowledged that his decision constituted "the first in
stance of prior restraint against a publication in this fashion in the history of this
country, to this Court's knowledge." Id.
137. Morland v. Sprecher, 99 S. Ct. 3086 (1979). The denial was principally
based on The Progressive's own delay before asking for expedition. Id. at 3087.
138. U.S. Drops Its Effort To Stop Publication Of H-Bomb Article, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 18, 1979, at 10, col. 3.
139. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681.
140. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). Professor
Vincent Blasi has described this function of the First Amendment as the "checking
value" and has concluded that "one of the most important values attributed to a free
press by eighteenth century political thinkers was that of checking the inherent tend
ency of government officials to abuse the power entrusted to them." Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J.
521, 538 (1977).
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seek to learn what it can, the press does not have a constitutional
right of access to all government information. "The Constitution it
self is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets
Act."141
To what extent, then, does news gathering qualify for First
Amendment protection? The Supreme Court strove to answer that
question in a series of cases in the mid-1970's. The principal con
clusion to be drawn from those decisions is that the Branzburg
dicta carried little, if any, weight in deciding specific cases and
probably is by now only a curiosity.

Access to Government Institutions and Persons Within Them
In Pell v. Procunier 142 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 143
the Burger Court clearly stated that the media have no greater
right of access to government facilities than does the general pub
lic. Both cases involved regulations by penal institutions banning
press interviews with inmates. 144
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Pell, said that the
California regulations were intended to conceal prison conditions or
to frustrate the press' investigation and reporting of those condi
tions. On the contrary, the majority found that the existing correc
tions policy provided the press and the general public opportuni
ties to observe prison conditions. 145 The challenged regulation had
reversed a previous policy permitting press interviews and was
imposed only after a violent episode that corrections officials be
lieved was at least partially attributable to the former policy. 146
After finding that the prison officials had shown good cause for
the regulation, the majority disposed of the media's constitutional
right of access argument by concluding that newsmen have no con

A.

141. Stewart, supra note 140, at 636 (footnote omitted).
142. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
143. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
144. Inmates of the California prison system and representatives of the press
instituted Pelt to challenge the constitutionality of a section of the California Depart
ment of Corrections Manual, which provided that "[p]ress and other media inter
views with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." 417 U.S. at 819. Saxbe
involved a challenge by the Washington Post of a policy statement of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons which prohibited interviews of individual inmates by press repre
sentatives, even when such interviews were requested by the inmate. The federal
policy, however, permitted conversation "with inmates whose identity is not to be
made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and
activities." Id. at 844 n.1.
145. Id. at 830.
146. Id. at 831 (footnote omitted).
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stitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates or to informa
tion beyond that afforded to the general public. 147 The majority
also rejected the prisoners' contention that their free speech rights
had been denied by the regulation. 148
In Saxbe, the majority opinion, again written by Justice
Stewart, found that the federal regulation was similarly merely a
reiteration of the general rule that inmates may be visited only by
a lawyer, clergyman, relative or friend. Thus the press was being
treated the same as the public generally.1 49 Viewing Saxbe as "con
stitutionally indistinguishable from Pell," the Court upheld the reg
ulation. 15o
The majority in both Pell and Saxbe rejected the notion that
the press' watchdog function warranted special access rights for the
media. That view was expressed in the dissents of Justice Douglas
in PelP51 and ofJustice Powell in Saxbe.1 52
Somewhat prophetically, Justice Douglas asked in dissent:
"Could the government deny the press access to all public institu
tions and prohibit interviews with all governmental employees?
Could it find constitutional footing by expanding the ban to deny
such access to everyone?"153 The answers were provided at least
in part by Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 154
On March 31, 1975, radio and television stations KQED of
San Francisco reported the suicide of a prisoner in the Santa Rita
Jail in Alameda County, California. The reports included a state
ment by a psychiatrist that the conditions at the facility created the
illnesses of his patient-prisoners there, and included a denial by
Thomas Houchins, the Alameda County sheriff. The sheriff refused
147. Id. at 834.
148. Id. at 821-28.
149. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 849.
150. Id. at 850.
151. 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice
Douglas' Pell dissent applied as well to Saxbe. Id. at 836. Joining in Justice Douglas'
dissent were Justices Brennan and Marshall.
152. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell then examined the Prison Bureau's rationale for· the ban and found it
insufficient for a total prohibition of prisoner-press interviews. Id. at 864-75. He fa
vored remanding the Saxbe case "with instructions to allow the Bureau to devise a
new policy." Id. at 874. In his Saxbe dissent, Justice Powell was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Justice Powell adopted the same reasoning for his dissent on
the press issue in Pell, in which he concurred with the majority on the prisoners'
claims. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 835-36 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis
senting in part).
153. 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. 438 U.S. I (1978).
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KQED's request to inspect and take pictures within the facility.155
As a result, KQED filed suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 156
claiming that its First Amendment rights had been violated by the
sheriff's failure to provide any effective means by which the public
could be informed of conditions at the jail or could learn of the
prisoners' grievances. 157 They further contended that television
coverage was the most effective means of informing the public of
jail conditions. 15s
The district court rejected the sheriff's contention that his pol
icies were necessary to protect inmate privacy and to minimize se
curity and administrative problems. The court granted a prelimi
nary injunction prohibiting the sheriff from denying KQED
representatives and other "'responsible representatives'" of the
news media access to the jail facilities " 'at reasonable times and
hours' " and from" 'preventing . . . [them] from utilizing photo
graphic and sound equipment or from utilizing inmate interviews
in providing full and accurate coverage of the . . . facilities.' "159
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal, rejecting the
sheriff's argument that Pell was controlling, and concluded that
both the public and the media had a First Amendment right of ac
cess to prisons and jails. 160
In his majority opinion161 reversing the court of appeals, Chief
Justice Burger agreed with many of KQED's generalized asser
tions: Conditions in jails and prisons are matters of great public im~
155. At that time, there was apparently no formal policy regarding public ac
cess to the jail. Id. at 4.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
157. The Alameda and Oakland branches of the NAACP joined in the suit,
claiming that public access to the information sought by KQED was essential for its
members to participate in the public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County.
438 U.S. at 4.
158. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the sheriff announced a new policy
and invited all interested persons to make arrangements for attending regular
monthly tours of the jail facility. Id. The tours, however, were limited to twenty-five
persons each on a first come, first served basis and did not include some of the most
controversial areas of the jail. Photographs of selected parts of the jail were made
available, but no cameras or tape recorders were allowed on the tours. Those on the
tours were not permitted to interview inmates, who were generally removed from
view. Not satisfied, KQED and the NAACP went forward with their suit. Id. at 4-5.
159. Id. at 6.
160. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1
(1978).
161. Chief Justice Burger's opinion was adopted by Justices White and
Rehnquist and Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was not materially different.
Three Justices dissented and two, Blackmun and Marshall, did not participate. 438
U.S. at 1.
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portance; the public can form its opinions about prison conditions
more intelligently the greater its information; and the media, as
the "eyes and ears" of the public, are a potentially constructive fac
tor in remedying abuses in the conduct of public business. 162 But
the Chief Justice could find no constitutional basis entitling the
public or the media to enter these institutions with camera equip
ment, and to take pictures of inmates for broadcast. More broadly,
he rejected any intimation in previous decisions of "a First Amend
ment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information
within government control. "163
The Houchins decision took two significant constitutional
steps. First, it rejected any relationship between the press' First
Amendment right to gather news and the responsibility of the gov
ernment to provide information. As the Burger Court interpreted
the earlier cases, the First Amendment concerns only the freedom
of the media to communicate information once obtained and does
not compel the government to provide the media with information
or access to it on demand. According to the majority, the
Branzburg dicta, stating that "news gathering is not without its
First Amendment protections, "164 provided no basis to compel the
government to supply information but stood only for the proposi
tion that there is a right to gather news from any lawful source. 165
Second, while the Court asserted that the issue in Houchins
was only "a claimed special privilege of access" by the media, and
that Fell and Saxbe were, therefore, controlling,166 Chief Justice
Burger's decision went far beyond a repetitious denial of a special
access right to the press. Underlying the media's access claims was
an asserted right of the public to know what its government is
doing and a responsibility of the press, as the public's "eyes and
ears," to provide that information. But if the press' special role af
forded it no special rights, the public's "right to know" fared no
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 707.
165. 438 U.S. at II. The majority pleaded that the Branzburg dicta "must be
read in context." Id. at 10. Yet, it neither quoted nor discussed the stated rationale
for the asserted First Amendment protection for newsgathering, that is, that without
such protection "freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 681. The
majority in Houchins apparently had no problem with eviscerating freedom of the
press by permitting the government to shut down legal access to information while
intimating to the press that its only constitutional right is to gather news "by means
within the law." 438 U.S. at II (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681).
166. 438 U.S. at 12.
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better. Previous Court references "to a public entitlement to infor
mation" were dismissed as meaning "no more than that the govern
ment cannot restrain communication of whatever information the
media acquire."167 Specifically rejecting any notion that either the
public or the media had a constitutional right to information about
government activities, the majority embraced Justice Stewart's pre
viously stated view that neither the press nor the public has a con
stitutional right of access to particular government information. 168
The two-pronged effect of Houchins is clear: The press has no
special right of access to government information to inform the
public because the public itself has no constitutional right to the
information. The focus of First Amendment cases in this area,
therefore, shifts from the right of the press and public to govern
ment information to the right of the government to keep its activi
ties secret.
The majority attempted to excuse its position in several ways.
The question of access to penal facilities, it asserted, presents legis
lative and executive concerns best left to experts. No one questions
the right and the responsibility of prison officials to impose regula
tions designed to maximize order and minimize invasions of pri
vacy. The very injunction appealed from limited the right of ac
cess, for example, to "reasonable times and hours," an order
clearly recognizing that right. But the Supreme Court's implicit
view that requiring access and maintaining order and privacy are
mutually exclusive is unsupported and unsupportable. 169
The majority further asserted that media access to prisons is
unnecessary to inform the public of jail conditions. It contended,
for example, that visiting citizens committees had provided impe
tus to the early English penal reform movements, and continue to
play an important role in keeping citizens informed. 170 Grand ju
ries and the legislature traditionally evaluate conditions in public,
tax-supported institutions such as prisons. 171 Also, the media have
167. Id. at 10.
168. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Stewart, supra note 140, at 636). See note 3 supra and
accompanying text.
169. Sheriff Houchins contended, for example, that "unregulated access by the
media would infringe inmate privacy, [and tend to create] 'jail celebrities,' who in
tum [would] tend to generate internal problems and undermine jail security," and
would otherwise "disrupt jail operations." 438 U.S. at 5 (footnote omitted). Neither
KQED's arguments nor the district court's preliminary injunction, however, can be
fairly read to require "unregulated access," but only access more meaningful than
the sheriff had been willing to provide. 438 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. [d. at 12-13.
171. [d. at 13.
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a First Amendment right to receive letters from inmates criticizing
jail officials and reporting on conditions, and they are free to inter
view prisoners' counsel, and to pursue former inmates, visitors to
the prison, public officials, and institutional personnel,172 such as
the complaining psychiatrist here. In California, the Board of Cor
rections has the statutory authority to inspect prisons and the duty
to provide a public report at regular intervals. 173
Without pretense of expertise in penology, common sense dic
tates that such indirect means of access constitute insufficient
mechanisms for informing the public of prison conditions. Inmates'
correspondence, for example, is often censored. Indeed, prior to
commencement of KQED's suit, prison rules in Alameda County
provided that all outgoing mail, except letters to judges and law
yers, would be inspected and prohibited any mention in outgoing
correspondence of the names or actions of any correctional offi
cers.174 While former prisoners and institutional personnel may in
form the media about prison conditions, they may have an equally
strong interest in concealing information or a fear about revealing
it. Pointedly, the prison psychiatrist, whose interview with KQED
had sparked the station's initial interest in visiting the Alameda
County facilities, was quickly discharged. 175 As to periodic inspec
tions and reports, the Court's assumption that such activities will
provide meaningful and disinterested information may not be
valid. 176
As a final justification for his conclusion, Chief Justice Burger
took a gratuitous swipe at the media, claiming that the media as
sumed that they were the best qualified persons for discovering
malfeasance in public institutions. The Chief Justice not only an
nounced that he could find no constitutional or judicial basis for
such an assumption, but further suggested that media representa
172. Id.at15.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The policy was eased somewhat after the
suit was filed, deleting the latter prohibition. Id. at 22. The point here is not the in
mate correspondence should not be censored (that is an argument for another con
text), but only that inmate mail may not be a very useful means of obtaining informa
tion. On the prisoners' rights issue, however, it is notable that a substantial number
of Santa Rita inmates were not convicted criminals'b'lt detainees awaiting trial. Id. at

37.
175. McCormick, Press Access to Jails and Prisons, Freedom of Information
Center Report No. 405, at 4 (1979).
176. One commentator suggested that the potential for inefficacy of such in
spections has been a historical problem, and quoted from Dumas' The Count of
Monte Christo. Id.
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tives are not confronted with being coerced by public opinion to
disclose what they might prefer to conceal as public officers some
times are. 177
One can easily dismiss this straw man attack unless he be
lieves that the foibles of journalists are any less human than anyone
else's. KQED's argument was not that media representatives pos
sess superior abilities to report jail conditions in an evenhanded
manner. Instead, the media have urged a recognition of the practi
cal as well as constitutional mandates of the situation. As a practical
matter, not everyone can view jail conditions for themselves; like
wise, not everyone, not even those with a vital concern for this is
sue, wants to. Given the media's responsibility in the constitutional
scheme of things to act for the public in watching its government's
functions and reporting on its shortcomings, any argument that the
press may make mistakes begs the question. As even the Chief
Justice has recognized in other contexts, what appears in newspa
pers and how public issues and public officials are treated are mat
ters for editorial judgment and control. 178
Not so easily dismissed, however, is the attitude reflected by
the Chief Justice's argument. Judging from his remarks, Chief Just
ice Burger has the impression that the media are pampered,
spoiled children who carp constantly, though enjoying special privi
leges and immunities they do not deserve. This kind of argument
may, then, serve to tell us a good deal more about the reasons be
hind some of the Burger Court's media law decisions than the con
sidered reasoning in the main portions of the opinions. While the
issues in Pell, Saxbe and Houchins were limited to media and pub
lic access to penal institutions, their broad conclusions have found
application in other contexts.

Access to Judicial Proceedings
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale 179 involved the right of the media
and the public to attend pretrial criminal proceedings. The Su
preme Court, in Craig v. Harney,180 had said that events in the
courtroom are public property. The press' right to report events
that transpire in the courtroom was also recognized in Shep
B.

177. 438 U.S. at 13-14.
178. Miami Herald Publishing CO. Y. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). See
also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 'y. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124
(1973).
179. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
180. 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
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pard. 18l Troublesome dicta in Branzhurg,182 however, cast doubt
on this right. Newsmen, the Court said in Branzhurg, "may be
prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if
. . . necessary to,assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial
tribunal. "183 Gannett afforded the Burger Court the opportunity to
decide whether it really meant that. It apparendy did.
In Gannett, a trial court judge in New York granted a motion
by two murder defendants to exclude the public and the press
from a pretrial hearing on the defendants' motion to suppress alleg
edly illegally obtained evidence. The case had received consider
able local publicity, and the trial court, while recognizing a consti
tutional right of press and public access to the proceedings, ruled
that such a right had to be balanced against the defendants' consti
tutional right to a fair trial. He found that in this case the latter
outweighed the former because publicity concerning an open sup
pression hearing would pose a reasonable probability of prejudice
to the defendants. 184 After the appellate division reversed and va
cated the trial judge's exclusion order,18S the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the exclusion of the press and media from the pro
ceedings notwithstanding New York law's presumption of open
criminal "trials"; that presumption was overcome, the court held,
because of the danger posed to the defendants' ability to receive a
fair trial. 186

181. 384 U.S. at 362-63.
182. 408 U.S. at 665.
183. rd. As support for this proposition, Branzburg cited only Sheppard's en
dorsement of "stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen,"
insulating witnesses from the press, and controlling extra-judicial statements to the
press by persons involved in the trial. 384 U.S. at 358-59. But nowhere does
Sheppard suggest, in its list of trial court powers to ensure a fair trial, that the press
may be barred outright from courtroom proceedings, or prevented from publishing
what they learn.
184. In the pre-trial hearing, the defendants specifically sought suppression of
allegedly illegally obtained confessions and physical evidence obtained as fruits of
those confessions, including a buried revolver belonging to the murder victim, to
which one of the defendants had led the police following his confession. 99 S. Ct. at
2903. The defendants argued that their right to a fair trial would be denied if the evi
dence were suppressed but reported to prospective jurors in the newspapers anyway.
rd.
185. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107,389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976),
rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), afI'd, 99 S. Ct. 2898
(1979).
186. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 377, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (1977),
afI'd, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
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On certiorari, five Justices 187 agreed that the Sixth Amend
ment's guarantee of a "public trial" is a right personal to the ac
cused and does not create "any right of access to a criminal trial on
the part of the public. "188 Although the majority recognized an in
dependent public interest in the enforcement of Sixth Amendment
guarantees, it said that did not create a constitutional right on the
part of the public. The public's interest, it said, was protected by
the adversary system of criminal justice. 189 Even assuming a public
right to open trials, however, the five Justices found no persuasive
evidence in common law supporting the public's right to attend
pretrial proceedings, which have never been as open to the public
as actual trials. 190 In short, the majority could find no constitution
al requirement for opening a pretrial criminal proceeding, such as a
suppression hearing, to the public even though the. participants
agreed that it should be closed to protect the defendants' right to a
fair trial. 191
The majority disintegrated, however, on the issue of whether
a separate First Amendment right on the part of the press and the
public to open criminal proceedings exists. Three of the five mem
bers of the majority192 evaded the question with the excuse that
the trial court had assumed First Amendment rights to exist and
had made its exclusionary order after assessing the competing soci
187. Justice Stewart wrote the majority's opinion. He was joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens.
188. 99 S. Ct. at 2905.
189. Id. at 2907. The majority noted, for example, that the public's interest in
jury trials is protected by the rule that a defendant cannot waive a jury trial without
the consent of the prosecutor and judge. "But if the defendant waives his right to a
jury trial, and the prosecutor and the judge consent, it could hardly be seriously ar
gued that a member of the public could demand a jury trial because of the societal
interest in that mode offact-finding." Id.
190. Id. at 2909, 2910.
191. Id. at 2908. In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall, argued that the Sixth Amendment does create an independent
constitutional interest on the part of the public in open criminal trials and that the
public may not be constitutionally barred from such trials "without affording full and
fair consideration to the public's interests in maintaining an open proceeding." Id. at
2933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters also would have held that the pub
lie's constitutional interest in open criminal proceedings extends to pretrial suppres
sion hearings as well as to trials themselves, because such hearings resemble and re
late "to the full trial in almost every particular" and are often critical and "may be
decisive, in the prosecution of a criminal case." Id. Finally, the dissenters felt that
the facts of this case did not present sufficient reason for concern about the defend
ants' fair trial rights to justify abridgement of the public's right to open proceedings.
Id.
192. ChiefJustice Burger, Justices Stewart and Stevens.
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etal interests involved rather than determining that First Amend
ment freedoms were not implicated. 193 Thus, the actions of the
trial judge were found to be "consistent with any right of access"
the complaining newspaper "may have had" under the First
Amendment,194 rendering it unnecessary to decide the First
Amendment issue.
Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, joined in the majority's
opinion but announced that he would hold explicitly that the peti
tioner's reporter had an interest protected by the First and Four
teenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial suppression
hearing. Justice Powell did not recognize any absolute right of ac
cess to courtroom proceedings, however, because he believed it
was limited by the constitutional right of defendants to a fair trial
and by the government's need to obtain just convictions and to
preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information and the iden
tity of informants. 19s On balance, Justice Powell believed that the
trial court correctly concluded that the defendants' Sixth Amend
ment fair trial rights would have been sufficiently endangered to
warrant an abridgement of the First Amendment rights of the pub
lic and press.
Justice Rehnquist also wrote separately on the First Amend
ment issue, but found no First Amendment right of access in the
public or the press to judicial or other governmental proceedings.
The First Amendment, he said, is not a constitutional sunshine law
requiring notice, an opportunity to be heard and substantial rea
sons before the public and press may be excluded from a govern
mental proceeding. 19s
Although four Justices dissented from the majority's position
that the Sixth Amendment creates no independent public right to
open trials, Justice Powell was not joined by any of the dissenters
on the First Amendment question. Writing for all four dissenters,
Justice Blackmun stated that the Sixth Amendment fixed the press'
and the public's right of access; he rejected the complaining news
paper's argument that the First Amendment requires that the free
flow of information about judicial proceedings not be cut off with
out justifying a prior restraint. But Justice Blackmun found no
need to address the broader issue of First Amendment access,
193. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. at 2912 (quoting Saxbe v. Wash
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 860 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
194. 99 S. Ct. at 2912 (emphasis added).
195. ld. at 2914, 2915 (Powell, J., concurring).
196. ld. at 2918 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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believing that the Sixth Amendment protected the right of ac
cess. 197
The Chief Justice, while joining in the majority's opinion,
wrote separately to "emphasize" his view of pretrial motions to
suppress evidence in criminal cases and took great pains to distin
guish hearings on such motions from criminal trials. But what he
was trying to tell us is obscure. If Gannett had involved a closed
criminal trial rather than a pretrial hearing, would he have voted
differently? He did say that, by definition, "a hearing on a motion
before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial; it is a pre trial [sic]
hearing,"198 and his italicization might suggest a different conclu
sion in a case involving the closure of a trial. He also italicized the
word "accused" in his quotation of the Sixth Amendment,199 indi
cating an adoption of the view of the four other majority Justices
that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial belongs to the ac
cused, not to the public. He also stated that the public's "interest"
in public trials "alone does not create a constitutional right. "200
Moreover, he joined in the majority opinion, with its explicit state
ment that the Sixth Amendment may not be properly viewed as
embodying a constitutional right of the public to attend criminal
trials. It would be dangerous, then, to assume that the Chief Just
ice intended to say that he would have taken a different view of a
case involving a closed criminal trial.
Depending on one's point of view, 201 lower court judges, after
Gannett, either exercised restraint in the use of their new power to
close criminal pretrial proceedings or stampeded to the courthouse
doors to close them to the press and public. Newsweek reported
197. Id. at 2940 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2913 (Burger, C.]., concurring) (emphasis in original).
199. "The Sixth Amendment states that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the ac
cused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial.' " Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI)
(emphasis added).
200. Id.
201. The press reacted to Gannett swiftly and predictably. Allen H. Neuharth,
chairman of Gannett Co., Inc., and chairman and president of the American Newspa
per Publishers Association, described the decision as "saying that the judiciary is a
private Supreme Club, which can shut the door and conduct public business in pri
vate." Press Sees Public Rights Jeopardized, Publisher's Auxiliary, July 9, 1979, at 3,
col. 1. The National Newspaper Association charged that "the twin concepts of a free
press and the public's right to know have been dealt another serious blow in the in
terest of going to an extreme to ensure a fair trial." Id. Jack Landau, director of the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, asserted that the decision would
"deprive the public of timely and critical information about the criminal justice
process." Id.
.
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that, in the month following Gannett, at least thirteen judges shut
their courtrooms while sixteen judges rejected motions to do so.
Inexplicably, three judges "barred the press, but not the pub
· "202
1IC.
Public debate over the wisdom of the Gannett decision, how
ever, was quickly overshadowed by a new debate among the Just
ices themselves over the scope of the decision. Did Gannett au
thorize trial court judges to close full criminal trials as well as
pretrial proceedings? The Chief Justice has said publicly that the
Gannett decision was limited to pretrial hearings;203 but Justice
Blackmun, who led the dissent in Gannett, has just as publicly dis
agreed, stating that the decision allowed the closure of full trials. 204
Justice Powell, however, has somewhat cryptically suggested that
trial judges might be "a bit premature" to read meanings into
Gannett beyond its narrow holding. 205
Whatever the subliminal message of Chief Justice Burger's
concurring opinion in Gannett, he clearly intended to confine his
vote to pretrial proceedings. Since his vote was crucial to the ma
jority, it would appear that trial judges were being "a bit prema
ture" in reading Gannett to mean that full trials may be closed. In
fact, the Supreme Court has held recently that the First and Four
teenth Amendments do guarantee to the public and the press a
right to attend criminal trials absent an overriding interest. Justice
Powell took no part in the decision and only Justice Rehnquist dis
sented. 206

C.

Access to Public Records
1.

Judicial Records

The Burger Court has considered both constitutional and stat
utory claims of a right on the part of the press and the public to in
spect public documents and records. The results have not deviated
markedly from those in other access cases.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. ,207 seven Justices
agreed that neither the press nor the public had a constitutional or
Press, Open and Shut Cases, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1979, at 69.
Confusion in the Courts, TIME, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82.
204. Greenhouse, Appeal Could Clarify Justices' Stand on Closed Courts, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 4, 1979, at 15, col. 1.
205. Id.
206. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 48 U.S.L.W. 5008 (July 2, 1980).
207. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
202.
203.
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common law right to inspect or copy tape recordings of White
House conversations admitted into evidence during the criminal
trial of Watergate figures John Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, John
Ehrlichman, Kenneth Parkinson and Robert Mardian. The jury and
the public had heard some twenty-two hours of taped conversations
during the course of the trial; and transcripts of the conversations,
although not admitted into evidence, were furnished by the district
court to the jurors, reporters and members of the public in attend
ance at the trial and were widely reprinted in the press.
Six weeks after trial had begun, several broadcasting organiza
tions sought permission of the district court to copy, broadcast and
sell to the public the portions of the tapes played at trial. Former
President Nixon, who asserted both property interests in the tapes
and executive privilege, opposed these requests. Judge Gesell rea
soned that the common law privilege of public access to judicial re
cords permitted the broadcasters to obtain copies of exhibits in the
custody of the clerk, including the tapes. Because of potential
administrative and mechanical difficulties, however, he prohibited
copying until termination of the trial. 208 The matter was thereafter
retransferred to Judge Sirica, the trial judge in the Watergate con
spiracy trial. Judge Sirica denied without prejudice the broadcast
ers' petitions for immediate access to the tapes, noting that all four
men convicted at trial had filed notices of appeal, and declaring
that their rights could be prejudiced by immediate access followed
by public dissemination of the recordings. 209
The court of appeals reversed, finding that the district court
had abused its discretion in allowing the mere possibility of preju
dice to the defendants' rights in the event of a retrial to outweigh
the public's right of access to judicial records. Although the court
of appeals' decision was based upon a common law interest in ac
cess, its opinion noted that the First Amendment sharply limited
the court's power to control the uses to which the tapes are put
once they are released. 210
208. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1974).
209. United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 186 (D. D.C. 1975), rev'd, 551 F.2d
1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. at 589.
210. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1263 n.52 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 589 (emphasis by the
Court). District court Judge Gesell, by contrast, had cautioned against
"overcommercialization" of the evidence and had requested the parties to submit
proposals for access and copying procedures that would minimize such over
commercialization. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D.D.C. 1974).
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In an opmIOn delivered by Justice Powell, five Justices held
that, considering all circumstances, the common law right of access
to judicial records did not authorize release of the tapes from the
district court's custody. The majority noted that the common law
right of access to judicial records was infrequently litigated; and,
therefore, its contours had not been delineated precisely. No pre
vious case addressed the applicability of the common law right to
exhibits subpoenaed from third parties. 211
Justice Powell's opinion purportedly followed established pre
cedent recognizing "a general right to inspect and copy public re
cords and documents, including judicial records and docu
ments. "212 That right is not conditioned on a proprietary interest in
the document or upon its evidentiary value in a lawsuit. 213 Beyond
this, and declarations that there is no absolute right to inspect and
copy judicial records 214 and that the trial court should decide the
issue of access,215 the majority made no further effort to delineate
precisely the contours of the common law right. 216 The majority
did not feel required to weigh the interests advanced by the par
ties in this case217 because it believed that the Presidential Record

211. 435 U.S. at 597. Some of the tapes had been received by the Watergate
Special Prosecutor follOWing the issuance of a 1973 subpoena duces tecum directing
then President Nixon to produce certain tapes, the existence of which had been re
vealed in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities. Id. at 591. The subpoena was upheld in In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
More tapes were made available following a second subpoena duces tecum issued in
1974 in preparation for the Mitchell trial. That subpoena was upheld in United
States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D. D.C.), afI'd sub nom. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
212. 435 U.S. at 597 (footnotes omitted).
213. Id. at 597.
214. "Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and ac
cess has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper
purposes," such as gratification of private spite or promotion of public scandal
through the publication of details of divorce cases or the use of judicial records as
sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing. Id.
at 598.
215. Id. at 599.
216. [d.
217. On the broadcasters' side of the scales were the incremental gain in public
understanding of the Watergate scandal and the presumption, however gauged, in fa
vor of public access to judicial records. On former President Nixon's side were his
asserted proprietary and privacy interests, the liIilit~d use of the subpoena tapes as
authorized by United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and the asserted impropri
ety of facilitation by the courts of the commercialization of the tapes. 435 U.S. at
600-02.
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ings and Materials Preservation Act (Act)218 provided an alternative
means of public access that justified denying release. 219
That Act created an administrative procedure for processing
and releasing to the public, on terms meeting with congressional
approval, all of former President Nixon's materials of historical in
terest, including recordings of the conversations at issue. This
meant to the majority that the district court was, thus, not the only
potential source of information regarding these materials, and that
the existence of the Act was crucial to exercising discretion regard
ing release of the tapes. 220
Following this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion meant
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying imme
diate public access to the tapes, and that the court of appeals erred
in its review by failing to add the weight of the Act to former Pres
ident Nixon's side of the scales. 221 Application of such reasoning
seemingly would have established that the public's right of access
to judicial records did not require release of the tapes, but the ma
jority actually held that the common law right of access did not au
thorize release of the tapes from the district court's custody. 222
Perhaps it was merely a slip of Justice Powell's pen, but his choice
of words appears to imply that something more than a weighing of
interests is involved in cases of this nature. An argument could be
constructed from this language prohibiting public access to judicial
records absent proof of authorization by those seeking access. This
would appear to gauge any presumption in favor of public access to
judicial records quite narrowly indeed.

218. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2017, 3315-3324 (1976).
219. 435 U.S. at 606.
220. [d. at 607.
221. The majority did not hold that the Act prohibited the district court from
releasing the tapes. Indeed, the Act appeared not to cover the handling of the spe
cific tapes at issue because they were copies of the original tapes and were not made
until after the time period relevant to the Act. [d. at 603-04 & n.15. In partial dissent,
Justices White and Brennan argued that the Act required delivery of all copies made
from the original Nixon White House tapes to the Administrator of General Services,
who alone (subject to congressional approval) had the power to regulate public ac
cess to the tapes. Justices White and Brennan, like the majority, would have reversed
the court of appeals' decision, but would have further ordered the delivery of the
district court's copies of the tapes to the Administrator. [d. at 611-12 (White, J., dis
senting in part). The majority, however, did not feel compelled to rule on the appli
cability of the Act to the specific tapes at issue. [d. at 604 n.15. For them, the Act's
only relevance to the case before the Court was that the Act provided an additional
outlet to the public for the contents of the tapes.
222. [d. at 608.
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The majority referred to Nixon as a concededly singular
case
and to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva
tion Act as a unique element. 224 As to the issues of the scope and
application of the public's common law right of access to judicial
records, Nixon may not be broadly applied in future cases. The
majority's determination of the broadcasters' constitutional argu
ments, however, will have significant influence. In support of their
position, the broadcasters relied on both the First and Sixth
Amendments for the proposition that the Constitution required
public access to the tapes played· in open court. The majority re
jected the arguments based on both amendments.
As to the First Amendment, the broadcasters relied on Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,225 which held that the First Amend
ment prohibited a state from outlawing the press from publishing
information in the public domain on official court records. 226 They
argued that Cox guaranteed the press' access to exhibits and mate
rials displayed in open court, but the majority limited Cox to
merely affirming the right of the press to publish accurately infor
mation contained in court records open to the public. 227 Cox did
not apply, the majority ruled, because what was involved here was
an asserted right to physical access to copies of the White House
tapes when the public had never received any such access. 228
Since the First Amendment generally does not grant the press a
right to information about a trial superior to that of the general
public, it did not compel press access to the tapes at issue. 229
The majority also rejected the broadcasters' argument that the
223

223. ld.
224. ld. at 603.
225. 420 U.S. 469 (1975); see text accompanying notes 473-88 infra.
226. 420 U.S. at 495.
227. 435 U.S. at 609.
228. Jurors, reporters and members of the public were provided with ear
phones during the Mitchell trial through which the portions of the tapes presented in
evidence were played. ld. at 594. As aids in listening to the exhibits, transcripts of
the tapes were provided to the jurors, counsel and news media representatives in at
tendance and these transcripts were widely reprinted in the press. ld. at 593 n.3,
594. The tapes themselves (that is, the district court's copies of the original tapes) re
mained in the custody of the district court, but were not made available by the court
for inspection or copying. ld. at 594 nn.3 & 4.
229. ld. at 609-10. The majority did not indicate the extent to which its deter
mination of the First Amendment issue was influenced by the crucial fact that the
broadcasters required a court's cooperation in furthering their commercial plans. The
commercial plans involved were desired by some of those seeking permission to
copy the tapes to sell to the public the portions of the tapes played at trial. ld. at
594, 602-03.
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Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial required release of
the tapes to facilitate public understanding of the Mitchell trial and
to permit the public to form its own judgments as to the meaning
of the recorded conversations. First, the majority found, the argu
ment proved too much because the same could be said of live testi
mony, yet no constitutional right exists to have such testimony re
corded and broadcasted. 230 Second, the purpose of the public trial
guarantee is not to confer any special benefit on the press, but to
assure that the courts do not become instruments of persecution.
The Court said that the Sixth Amendment is satisfied if the public
and the press have an opportunity to attend the trial and to report
what they have observed, as was the case here. 231
Two Justices dissented in the result. Justice Marshall did not
consider the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act decisive since by its terms it did not apply to the district
court's copies of the original White House tapes. He argued that
the Act strongly indicated that the tapes should be released to the
public. 232 Justice Stevens similarly found the majority's reliance
upon the Act ironic. 233 Neither dissenting Justice directly confronted
the constitutional issues. But Justice Stevens' references to United
States v. Mitchell 234 and to the Mitchell trial's "special characteris
tics" and to the "great historical interest" in "the conduct disclosed
by the evidence," the full understanding of which "may affect the
future operation of our institutions, "235 could serve as the basis for
a response to the majority's rather pedantic disposition of the
broadcasters' First Amendment argument. The reason no First
Amendment right exists to broadcast the testimony of live
witnesses at an ordinary criminal trial is the perception that the
First Amendment must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial free of the distractions caused by
cameras, flood lights and tape recorders.236 No such considerations
were involved here. Justice Stevens' language, however, suggests
the more compelling insufficiency of the majority's constitutional
230. [d. at 610 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-42 (1965)).
231. 435 U.S. at 610. C/. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2909
(1979) (the press may not have access under the circumstances of Gannett). See text
accompanying notes 179-206 supra.
232. 435 U.S. at 613 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. [d. at 616-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D. D.C.), a/I'd sub nom. United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974).
235. [d. at 616.
236. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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analysis: this was no ordinary criminal trial. Whatever the usual
standard to be applied in ordinary cases involving an asserted First
Amendment right of access to judicial records, the Watergate trial
undoubtedly warranted a special standard. As Justice Stevens
noted, this was not a case in which the media argued a right to
broadcast testimony to enable the public to make its own informed
verdict of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It was the conduct
disclosed by the evidence, not the persuasiveness of the evidence
in the context of the criminal trial, that the public had an interest
in. The need for a full public understanding of that conduct, based
upon its own interpretations of the conversants' statements, tones
of voice and inflections, made this a special case. The majority's
failure to perceive that makes the result in Nixon difficult to ac
cept.
2.

Freedom of Information Act-Agency Records

The Supreme Court made two significant rulings in 1979 con
cerning the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)237 that, while not
involving media parties directly, will influence the ability of the
press to obtain, through FOIA, public records in 'the hands of fed
eral agencies.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 238 a unanimous Court construed
FOIA exclusively as a disclosure statute which affords no private
right of action to enjoin agency disclosure to parties to government
contracts compelled by government regulations to supply sensitive
information to various agencies. The Act's provisions exempting
certain categories of records from FOIA's disclosure requirements
were viewed only as being concerned with the agencies' need or
preference for confiden tiality and not as mandating nondisclosure
even if the agency had no objection to disclosure. By itself, the
Court said, FOIA protects the interests of private parties sub
mitting information only to the extent that the agency receiving the
information endorses those interests.
237. 5 U.S.c. § 552 (1976). FOIA essentially requires, inter alia, that federal
agencies make available for inspection and copying, on demand, records in their pos
session and under their control, unless such records fall within specified categories
of exemptions. Earlier Burger Court FOIA decisions include NLRB v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352 (1976); FAA Adm'r v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v.
Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1
(1974); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
238. 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
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Chrysler Corporation had sought to enjoin disclosure by the
Department of Defense's Defense Logistics Agency of certain sub
missions by Chrysler reporting on its affirmative action employ
ment programs. The reports had been submitted pursuant to regu
lations requiring such information of all government contractors.
Notwithstanding exemption from mandatory disclosure by FOIA,
the regulations provided for availability of such information to the
public upon a determination that disclosure would further the pub
lic interest and would not impede agency functions, except where
such disclosure was prohibited by law. Chrysler argued that disclo
sure of its submissions was barred by FOIA exemptions and would
be inconsistent with the Trade Secrets Act 239 which imposes crimi
nal sanctions on government employees who disclose to any extent
not authorized by law certain classes of information submitted to a
government agency, including confidential statistical data.
Besides rejecting Chrysler's arguments that FOIA mandated
nondisclosure of the exempted categories of information and that it
created a private right of action to enjoin disclosure of exempted
material, the Court also held that the Trade Secrets Act did not af
ford a private right of action to enjoin disclosure in violation of that
statute. Even though the Court deemed disclosure of the material
not authorized by law within the meaning of the Trade Secrets Act,
it could find nothing in that Act to afford a private right of action
under this criminal statute, especially since the agency's decision
was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. 240 Unless
overruled by congressional action, Chrysler's effect should put an
end to most reverse-FOIA suits by private entities seeking to avoid
government disclosure of exempted information produced by them
to government agencies. 241
The Supreme Court's second significant FOIA decision in 1979
was Federal Open Market Commission of the Federal Reserve Sys
tem v. Merrill,242 where seven Justices 243 rejected an argument
that federal agencies have a right under FOIA to delay release of
policy reports merely because they deem such delay to be neces
sary to protect their own efficiency. At the same time they recog
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
240. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
241. For a discussion of some of these suits by private parties, see Schorr, Tell
ing Tales: How Law Is Being Used to Pry Business Secrets From Uncle Sam's Files,
Wall St. J., May 9, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
242. 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979).
243. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented.
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nized a "qualified privilege" in the Act for confidential commercial
information generated by the government itself in the process lead
ing up to awarding a contract. This "qualified privilege" permitted
the Federal Reserve System to delay public disclosure of certain
monthly monetary directives that were in effect, provided the di
rectives contained sensitive information not otherwise available and
immediate release of the directives would significantly harm the
government's monetary functions or commercial interests. 244
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the directives were ei
ther required by FOIA to be released currently or were exempted
from the Act, in which case its provisions did not apply.245 He
could find no middle ground for another alternative for exempt ma
terial to which the Act nonetheless applies, even though on a de
layed basis. 246 Since he could find no exemption in FOIA concern
ing the directives, Justice Stevens would have held that the statute
mandated current availability to the public. He said that the major
ity's newly created category, would impose substantial litigation
costs and burdens on any party seeking to overcome an agency's
objection to immediate disclosure. 247
IV.

THE

SANCTITY OF THE NEWSROOM

Public Access to the Media
In an influential 1967 article, Professor Jerome A. Barron ar
gued that the prevailing First Amendment theory of a self
operating "marketplace of ideas" had become outmoded. The mod
ern mass media, he asserted, had closed the marketplace to
unorthodox points of view by denying them access to media outlets
while hiding behind the First Amendment to claim immunity for
their actions. Professor Barron maintained that the constitutional
imperative of free expression had devolved into a rationale for re
pressing competing ideas and that First Amendment theory must
be reexamined in order that the constitutional guarantee of free
speech best serve its original purposes. 248
A.

244. 99 S. Ct. at 2812, 2814.
245. Id. at 2815-16 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(I), (b) (1976) (Stevens, J., dis
senting)).
246. Id. at 2816.
247. Id. "For henceforth, that party must prove that compliance with the stat
ute's disclosure mandate would not 'significantly harm the Government's monetary
functions or commercial interests.' " Id.
248. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1642 (1967).
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To promote dissemination and confrontation of diverse view
points, Professor Barron urged that the right to be heard should be
recognized as a constitutional principle, and he proposed that the
courts establish a remedy for a right of access. In the alternative,
he suggested that a forum for the expression of diverging opinions
was secured in the constitutional law which authorized a carefully
framed right of access statute which would forbid an arbitrary de
nial of space. 249
Professor Barron's comments immediately received consider
able attention,250 with an ensuing debate over the validity of his
premise and the wisdom of his proposals. Within seven years, how
ever, the Burger Court laid to rest any right of access to the print
media. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 251 the Su
preme Court overturned a Florida decision upholding the constitu
tionality of a right of access statute. 252 The Florida Supreme Court
had embraced the view that since ownership of the mass media
was being concentrated in a limited number of hands, a form of
private censorship existed which jeopardized the public's right to
know all sides of a controversy. It upheld the statute on the theory
that it prohibited nothing and required additional information for
full and fair discussion. 253
249. Id. at 1678. Professor Barron further developed his access theory in a
series of subsequent articles. See Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of
Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access-The Only
Choice for the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766 (1970).
250. See, e.g., the literature compiled in Lange, The Role of the Access Doc
trine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1973).
251. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
252. See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973),
rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The statute in question, FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973), read
as follows:
104.38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; space for reply-If
any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate
for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candidate with
malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record,
or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon
request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may
make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the
matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up more
space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with
the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first de
gree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
418 U.S. at 244-45 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973)).
253. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 82-83 (Fla. 1973),
rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). This case arose when the Miami Herald refused a legisla
tive candidate's demand under the statute for reply space following an editorial at
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The United States Supreme Court's virtually unanimous opin
ion, delivered by Chief Justice Burger, said that the clear impli
cation of the Court's previous decisions was that it was
unconstitutional for the media to publish that which "reason" tells
should not be published. 254 While recognizing the undoubtedly de
sirable goal of a responsible press, the Court declared that the
press' sense of responsibility is not mandated by the Constitu
tion. 255 Moreover, the opinion found that the statute exacted an
impermissible penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper,
consisting of the cost in printing and composing time and materials
and of taking up space that could be devoted to other material that
the newspaper may have preferred to print. 256 Chief Justice
Burger also found the statute repugnant because of its intrusion
into the function of editors. Government regulation of the editorial
process, the Court found, could not coexist with the First Amend
ment. 257
While a clear victory for the media, the Court's opinion in
Tornillo is lamentable in several respects. First, it painstakingly set
out the arguments in favor of Professor Barron's access theory,
including the statistics pointing to a rapidly increasing concentra
tion of newspaper ownership but dispensed with a studied refuta
tacking him and his candidacy. The candidate sued for declaratory and injunctive re
lief and for damages. The Miami Herald responded by seeking a declaration that the
statute was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court's decision upholding the
statute was a reversal of the trial court's ruling that the legislation was an
unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of the press. 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972).
254. 418 U.S. at 256.

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 258. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion for
the sole purpose of pointing out that the Court's decision in Tornillo was limited to
"right of reply" statutes and implied no view upon the constitutionality of "retraction"
statutes affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to
require publication of a retraction. [d. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice White, concurring, agreed with the Chief Justice that the Florida statute
violated the First Amendment proposition that government may not force a news
paper to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the
newsroom floor. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring). Justice White viewed Tornillo as
a proper balance between First Amendment interests and the government's legiti
mate concern for protecting individual reputational interests. But he took the occa
sion to express his view that the result in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), announced on the same day an.d discussed below, represented an improper
balance of these same two interests because, in' his view, Gertz went far toward
eviscerating the effectiveness of the ordinary libel action, thereby deprecating indi
vidual dignity and leaving people at the complete mercy of the press. Id. at 262,
262-63.
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tion. Instead, it relied heavily on other decisions which assumed
that access requirements were unconstitutional, without justifYing
that assumption substantively.258 Commentators have even as
serted, not without some justification, that the Tornillo opinion
lacked reasoned support. 259 Rather, the Tornillo decision simply
decided that editorial content should be left to the discretion of the
editors and that principle was not outweighed by whether more in
formation would reach more people. 260 Regrettably, the lack of
substantial refutation to Professor Barron's arguments in Chief Just
ice Burger's approach may permit a resurrection of the access
theory and a successful effort in the future to permit governmental
intervention in the editorial process. There are even those among
us who fear that Chief Justice Burger, faced with eight other Just
ices not persuaded by the access theory, elected to write the Tor
nillo opinion in such a way as to leave open the possibility that an
other court less interested in editors' First Amendment role might
adopt the access theory. The paranoia that has sprung from the
Chief Justice's announced views of the press in general, and editors
in particular, has no doubt fueled this fear.
Perhaps more remarkable, the Tornillo opinion conflicts abso
lutely with the Supreme Court's previous decision concerning the
public's right of access to the broadcast media. That decision con
cerned the Fairness Doctrine of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), formally announced in 1949, requiring broad
casters to devote a reasonable percentage of time to the coverage
of public issues and offer "fair" coverage by providing an opportu
nity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. 261
The Fairness Doctrine, as developed by the FCC,262 focuses
258. Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE L.J. 361, 364 (1976). The opin
ions referred to were Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Asso
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945).
Professor Abrams defends the Chief Justice's use of these opinions by noting
that his decision "claimed no more of the earlier opinions than that they had long
since placed a 'judicial gloss' on the First Amendment strongly pointing to the un
constitutionality of compulsory access. And they had." Abrams, supra at 373 (foot
note omitted).
259. Abrams, supra note 258, at 363 (footnote omitted).
260. Id. at 367 (footnote omitted).
261. FCC, Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949).
262. The Doctrine was refined in FCC, Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest
Standards, Fairness Report Regarding Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,
372 (1974).
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more particularly on broadcast personal attacks and political edito
rials. The Commission's regulations require that, in the event of a
personal attack on an identified person during the course of a pre
sentation of views on a controversial issue, the broadcaster notify
the attacked individual and offer him a reasonable opportunity to
respond. In the event of a political endorsement by a broadcast sta
tion, the licensee must afford an opportunity to respond by the en
dorsed candidate's opponents or their spokesmen. 263
The Warren Court declared these regulations constitutionally
permissible in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 264 Red Lion, to
gether with its companion case, United States v. Radio Television
News Directors Association (RTNDA),265 and Tornillo appear
factually indistinguishable. Like Tornillo, RTNDA involved political
editorials. 266 Like Tornillo, Red Lion involved an attack on an
identified individual published by the media. 267 Like Tornillo, Red
Lion and RTNDA involved a governmentally imposed requirement
that the subject of a personal attack be given an opportunity to re
spond in the same medium in which the attack occurred. Yet the
Warren Court decided unanimously in favor of the regulation in
Red Lion, and the Burger Court decided unanimously in favor of
the press in Tornillo. The only difference between the cases is the
medium involved; Red Lion concerned broadcasting, Tornillo a
newspaper. Why the result in Tornillo differed from Red Lion re
mains a complete mystery since Red Lion was not even cited in
Tornillo.
Adding to the mystery, the Warren Court found persuasive
virtually the identical arguments the Burger Court rejected:
1. Scarcity. The Warren Court found government regulation
263. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1979).
264. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
265. 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
266. Rather than involving a particular broadcast, RTNDA arose as an action to
review the FCC's 1967 promulgation of the personal attack and political editorial
regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1979). The rules were held unconstitutional by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as abridging the freedoms of speech and
press. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th
Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
267. Red Lion actually arose before the final promulgation of the FCC's per
sonal attack regulations and was litigated under the Commission's broader Fairness
Doctrine as interpreted in the personal attack context in Times-Mirror Broadcasting
Co., 24 HAD. REG. (P & F) 404 (1962). Red Lion Broadcasting appealed an order of
the FCC that it provide reply time to an individual attacked in a broadcast carried by
its station. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Commis
sion's order. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
aff'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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of broadcast media content necessary in Red Lion because of the
scarcity of broadcast channels and the inability of all citizens to
broadcast their views on the limited number of available frequen
cies. 268 Even recognizing rapid technological advances, such as mi
crowave transmission, that have created more efficient use of spec
trum space, the Court declared that there is still concern about
scarcity of available frequencies. 269 This scarcity was found in Red
Lion to be a justification for the FCC's regulations. In Tornillo, the
Burger Court found a greater scarcity to exist in newspapers, to
gether with a trend toward chain-owned newspapers. The Court
was concerned that chain-owned newspapers made the industry
less competitive and increased the potential for a fewer number of
industry leaders to manipulate popular opinion and to influence the
course of events. 270 Yet this scarcity of newspaper outlets did not,
in the Burger Court's view, outweigh the newspapers' First
Amendment immunity from government intrusion in the editorial
process.
2. Monopolization. In Red Lion, the Warren Court, referring
to "frequency monopolies" conferred by the government on a rela
tively small number of licensees, declared that the First Amend
ment provided "no sanctuary" for "unlimited private censorship
operating in a medium not open to aI1."271 In Tornillo, the Burger
Court pointed out that one-newspaper towns predominate and only
four percent of the large cities have competing newspapers.272 The
Court also found that this monopoly of the means of communica
tion lessened the public's ability to respond or to contribute
meaningfully to the debate on issues. 273 Further, the same eco
nomic factors that have led to the demise of competing newspapers
and the creation of monopoly markets have also prevented new
market entrants. 274 Yet the Burger Court considered this monopoly
power, greater in the newspaper field than in either television or
radio, to be insufficient to require public access to the print media.
3. Enhancement of Free Speech. In both Red Lion and Tor
nillo, the proponents of media access argued that the government's
268. 395 u.s. at 376-77.
269. Id. at 396-97.
270. 418 U.S. at 249.
27l. 395 U.S. at 390, 392.
272. 418 U.S. at 249 n.13 (quoting A. Balk, Background Paper, reprinted in
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE REPORT FOR A NATIONAL NEWS COUN
CIL,

A FREE AND RESPONSIVE
273. Id. at 250.
274. Id. at 25l.

PRESS

18 (1973)).
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access requirements enhanced, rather than abridged, free speech
because of the requirements' guarantees that all viewpoints would
be published. The Warren Court, apparently persuaded by this ar
gument in the broadcasting context, explained that a goal of the
First Amendment was to produce "an informed public capable of
conducting its own aH'airs"275 and found nothing inconsistent with
that goal in requiring the opportunity to respond to personal at
tacks or political endorsements. In Tornillo, the Florida Supreme
Court had found that the statute at issue did not impinge First
Amendment rights because it did not exclude any newspaper con
tent. 276 The Burger Court disagreed, finding that the statute had
the same effect as a statute or regulation forbidding publication of
specified matter. Governmental restraints on publication, it said,
could be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental pow
ers.277
4. Reduction of Discussion of Controversial Issues. In Tor
nillo, the Burger Court expressed the fear that publishers faced
with the penalties that would accrue upon the publication of news
or commentary within the reach of the right of access statute278
might well choose to avoid controversy. If that were the case, such
statutes would only serve to blunt or reduce political and electoral
coverage. 279 In Red Lion, however, the Court abruptly dismissed
such fears as speculative. 280
5. Rights of the Public. The Warren Court, in Red Lion, an
nounced that nothing in the First Amendment prevented the gov
ernment from requiring a broadcast licensee to act as a proxy or fi
duciary for the public, with an obligation to present views
unrepresentative of the community that would otherwise not be
aired. 281 On the contrary, the public has a First Amendment inter
est in having such views available and the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, is paramount. 282 In
275. 395 U.S. at 392.
276. 287 So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
277. 418 U.S. at 256.
278. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
279. 418 U.S. at 257.
280. 395 U.S. at 393. The Court noted that if this became a problem, however,
"the Commission is not powerless to insist that [broadcasters] give adequate and fair
attention to public issues." Id. Assuming that is true, it is admittedly one additional
distinguishing feature between Red Lion and Tornillo, since there is no governmen
tal power that can require newspapers to do the same.
281. Id. at 389.
282. I d. at 390. This view parallels that expressed by the FCC in its initial an
nouncement of the Fairness Doctrine:
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Tornillo, it was similarly argued that the claim of newspapers had a
role to playas surrogates for the public, but that newspapers had a
fiduciary obligation to account for that stewardship. Further, in
view of the monopolies controlled by the owners of most newspa
pers, it was argued that affirmative government action was re
quired as the "only effective way to insure fairness and accuracy
and to provide for some accountability. "283 The Burger Court re
jected this argument, opining that press responsibility, while desir
able, was neither mandated by the Constitution nor capable of be
ing legislated. 284 Moreover, the Court contended that the
affirmative governmental action urged by proponents of access
would require an invasion of the exercise of editorial control and
judgment, which exercise, the Court found, could not be con
ducted consistently with the First Amendment. 285
Despite various attempts to reconcile Red Lion and Tor
nillo,286 they fundamentally conflict. Red Lion adopts a series of
policy arguments that appear sound as a matter of practicality,
while Tornillo rejects these same arguments, perhaps in the face of
even more persuasive factual evidence, in favor of equally sound
and perhaps more compelling constitutional principles. If these
principles override the practical aspects of the newspaper industry,
they should do so with respect to the broadcast industry as well; if
they do not, it is because of the "uniqueness" of the broadcast me
dia, a concept often alluded to but never sufficiently explained. 287
In any event, if the Burger Court intended that its constitutional
reasoning in Tornillo should not apply to broadcasting, it could
have, and should have, said so and explained the relationship beIt is this right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part
of the Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the
public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter, which is the
foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting.
FCC, Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
283. 418 U.S. at 251.
284. Id. at 256.
285. Id. at 258.
286. See, e.g., Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of
Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1976).
287. Red Lion describes broadcasting as a "unique medium," on the basis that
"there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre
quencies to allocate." Id. at 388 & 390. But the fact is that in virtually every market
of any size there are today far more broadcasting facilities than daily newspapers.
And, as the Burger Court pointed out in Tornillo, economic considerations make it as
difficult today to successfully publish a new daily newspaper as economic and tech
nical considerations make it difficult to open a new broadcast facility.
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tween Tornillo and Red Lion that it intended. As it stands, Tornillo
invites the broadcasting industry to request a review of the Red
Lion opinion. This invitation, it is hoped, will be quickly accepted.
B.

Searches of Newspaper Property

On April 8, 1971, demonstrators occupied the administrative
offices of the Stanford University Hospital. The next day police
were called in to remove them. Demonstrators armed with sticks
and clubs attacked a group of nine policemen, breaking one police
man's shoulder and injuring the other eight. The Stanford Daily,
the student-run campus newspaper, published a special edition on
the incident, including photographs. The district attorney's office
obtained a warrant to search the Daily's offices for any prints or
negatives that might help identify those who assaulted the police.
Officers searched through filing cabinets, desks and wastebaskets
but found no pictures except those already published in the Daily.
The Daily challenged the constitutionality of the search by
suing the policemen, the district attorney and others for violating
its federal civil rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. Al
though the newspaper won in both the trial court288 and the court
of appeals,289 the Supreme Court reversed in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily,290 holding against the newspaper on both its constitutional
arguments.
The Fourth Amendment declares inviolate "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures," and says that search
warrants shall issue only "upon probable cause. "291 The Stanford
Daily argued thereunder that an unannounced search for criminal
evidence at the premises of a party not itself suspected of a crime
was legal only if the person may otherwise destroy the evidence.
Absent probable cause to believe that the Daily or its staff were
implicated in the assault on the police, the officials who wanted the
288. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afI'd, 550
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The district court denied the
newspaper's request for an injunction, but, upon the Daily's motion for summary
judgment, granted declaratory relief.
289. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S.
547 (1978).
290. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The five Justice majority opinion was written by Just
ice White. Justice Powell joined in the majority opinion but filed a separate concur
ring opinion. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Stevens dissented, while Justice
Brennan took no part in the decision.
291. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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photographs should have, in the newspaper's view, proceeded by a
subpoena, which, unlike a search warrant, would have given the
Daily prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme
Court characterized that argument as a remarkable, sweeping revi
sion of the Fourth Amendment because the amendment made no
distinction between criminal suspects and others as possessors of
material sought for purposes of law enforcement. 292
On the First Amendment issue, the newspaper argued that
the official intrusion into a newsroom without notice or a chance to
object presented an extremely grave violation of press freedoms. It
posited a "chilling" of the whole editorial process from the fear of
scrutiny by the state and contended that searches might disclose
confidential sources as well. The majority of the Supreme Court
found these claims unconvincing. Justice White's opinion said that
because the framers of the Constitution did not make any special
provision for the press when drafting the Fourth Amendment, they
must have thought that the general rules of reasonableness and
probable cause sufficiently protected the press. 293 Nor was the ma
jority persuaded that press sources would dry Up.294 Finally, it
found no reason to believe that magistrates, who issue the majority
of warrants, could not guard against unduly intrusive searches of
newspapers. 295
Not every Justice was unpersuaded by the newspaper's First
Amendment arguments, however. Justice Stewart, joined by Just
ice Marshall, filed a strong dissenting opinion. 296 He stated: "po
lice searches of newspaper offices burden the freedom of the press.
. . . [and] will inevitably interrupt its normal operations, and thus
impair or even temporarily prevent the processes of newsgather
ing, writing, editing, and publishing."297 He. also argued that an
unannounced police search of a newspaper office could have a chill
ing effect on information received from confidential sources. Those
292. 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978). This decision followed the expansive view of the
Fourth Amendment taken by the Warren Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967), which abandoned an earlier doctrine prohibiting search warrants for "mere
evidence," as opposed to instrumentalities, contraband or fruits of crime.
293. 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
294. [d. at 566. The majority found in any event that "[wlhatever incremental
effect there may be in this regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are per
missible in proper circumstances, it does not make a constitutional difference in our
judgment." Id.
295. [d.
296. 436 U.S. 547, 571-73 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 571.
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sources need protection to ensure that the press can fulfill its con
stitutionally designated function of informing the public. Important
information can often be obtained only by an assurance that the
source will not be revealed.
He said that a search warrant allows police officers to read
each and every document in a newspaper's files until they have
found the one named in the warrant. Therefore, it would be possi
ble to have needless exposure of confidential information com
pletely unrelated to the purpose of the investigation. Conse
quently, confidential news sources will dry up. The end result
would be a diminishing flow of potentially important information to
the public. 298
The media swiftly reacted to the Stanford Daily decision with
predictable outrage. Benjamin Bradlee expressly opposed it. 299
Allen Neuharth, president of the American Newspaper Publishers
Association and of Gannett Newspapers, said that the decision put
"a sledgehammer in the hands of those who would batter the
American people's First Amendment rights. . . . It literally and le
gally picks the lock that protects the exercise of a free press .
. . . "300 Walter Cronkite predicted the potential results of the deci
sion: "[A] warrant is signed by a judge, who [frequently] owes his
election to the [local] political machine. . . . [S]ources dry up,
scandal dies, and the political machine is free. . . . "301 Perhaps
the most impassioned reaction came from Howard K. Smith who
analogized this to an experience he had as a new young reporter at
the United Press in Nazi Berlin when fifteen Gestapo men knocked
at his door, barged past him, began opening every desk and for six
hours studied every piece of paper they could find. 302
Others, like Anthony Lewis, a Lecturer on Law at Harvard
Law School and a columnist for The New York Times, expressed as
much alarm to the press' reaction as to the decision. Unpersuaded
by the Stanford Daily's argument that the First Amendment ac
corded the press special protection against search warrants, Mr.
Lewis chastised the media for narrow-mindedness in their reactions
to the Supreme Court's decision. The real danger in the Stanford
Daily case, he said, lay in the magnitude of the search and its in
298. Id. at 571-72.
299. Leading Media Figures Attack Police Raid Ruling,
THE LAW 4 (1978).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302.

[d.
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trusive quality. Persons who are not themselves suspected of any
crime but are thought to have evidence could be harmed. Doctors,
lawyers and others, Mr. Lewis pointed out, may fear unreasonably
intrusive police searches through their files. 303
The lower courts did not hesitate to apply the Stanford Daily
decision in other contexts. On August 11, 1978, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the federal
government could subpoena telephone company records of a jour
nalist's long distance telephone calls and could review those re
cords without providing any prior notice. The court reasoned that
government access to third-party evidence in the course of a good
faith felony investigation in no sense abridged news gathering and
placed no burden on journalists except "mere inconvenience. "304
A number of state and federal legislators have introduced leg
islation to nullify the Stanford Daily decision. Some of the pro
posed legislation would protect the press only from third-party
search warrants in which the subject of the search warrant is not it
self suspected of a crime and there is no probable cause to believe
that evidence would be destroyed if a search warrant did not issue.
Other proposed legislation adopts the concerns expressed by Mr.
Lewis and would prohibit the issuance of a search warrant against
anyone not suspected of having committed a crime.
Interestingly, the first state to enact protective legislation after
the Stanford Daily decision was California. On September 23,
1978, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., signed a bill that included
an amendment extending the state's shield law to prohibit news
room searches. That enactment applies strictly to media and media
personnel. 305
The Carter Administration, in December 1978, proposed a
new law to protect reporters, scholars and their sources from
303. Czerniejewski, Your Newsroom May Be Searched, The Quill, July-Aug.
1978, 21, 24-25; see also Lewis, Comment, 30 Harv. L. Sch. Bull. No.1, 5, 7-8 (1978).
304. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
305. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending id.
§ 1524 (West 1972)) prohibits the issuance of a warrant for any item described in
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending id. § 1070 (West 1965)),
the California reporters' "shield" law. Eight states have passed legislation geared to
ward overturning the results reached in Stanford. They are: California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West 1979); 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts 79-14 § 1; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 108-3
(1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-813 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A;84A-21.9 (West 1979);
1979 Or. Laws ch. 820; CRIM. PROC. ANN. TEX. CODE art. 18.01(e) (Vernon 1980);
1979 Wis. Laws ch. 81.
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searches by federal, state and local law enforcement officers. The
Administration's proposal would prohibit law enforcement officers
from searching the notes, photographs and other "work product" of
reporters, scholars and others who disseminate information to the
public. The only exceptions would arise where a search was
deemed necessary to prevent serious injury to an individual, or
where the person possessing protected material was believed to
have committed a crime for which the material would be evidence.
The proposal would extend protection to those who have gathered
information with the intention of making it available for publication
or broadcast. 306 None of this legislation has, as yet, been enacted.

C.

Protection of Confidential Sources
In Stanford Daily, 307 the majority referred to its decision in
Branzhurg and dismissed the newspaper's argument that confiden
tial sources might "dry up" if they had reason to fear warranted
searches of newspaper offices by the police. The Branzhurg deci
sion308 involved a group of cases in which reporters had been sub
poenaed by grand juries to testifY about criminal activities they had
witnessed or learned of from confidential news sources during the
course of investigations for news stories. Each reporter claimed a
qualified privilege not to appear or to testifY before a grand jury
until and unless sufficient grounds were shown for believing that:
(1) The journalist possesses information relevant to a crime under
investigation by the grand jury; (2) the information the journalist
has is unavailable from other sources; and (3) "the need for the in
formation is sufficiently compelling to override the ... invasion of
First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure."309 The
privilege was necessary, the reporters asserted, because informants
would become reluctant to provide newsworthy information if jour
nalists were forced to respond to subpoenas and to identifY their
sources or to disclose other confidences. This, they argued, would
place an unconstitutional burden on news gathering.
A clear majority of the Court found that the reporters lacked
any privilege not to appear before the grand juries. 310 The plurality
306. Carter Proposes Law to Shield Reporters, Others From Search, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 14, 1978, at 45, col. 4.
307. 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978).
308. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
309. ld. at 680.
310. Justice White wrote a plurality opinion joined by three other Justices,
including the Chief Justice, which concluded that reporters shared the obligation of
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opinion of four failed to identify any constitutional basis for a re
porter's privilege of any sort not to testify. In sum, the plurality
found:
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding
that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring ef
fective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the con
sequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said
to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, re
spond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid
jury investigation or criminal trial. 311

The plurality further rejected the asserted qualified reporter's priv
ilege on the grounds of a lack of efficacy312 and problems that
would arise in judicial administration. 313
In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that journalists ought to en
joy not a qualified but an absolute privilege not to appear or testify
before a grand jury concerning their sources or professional ob
servations. 314 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, also in dissent, urged adoption of a qualified privilege
not to testify, abridgeable only upon a showing of relevance, ex
haustion of alternate sources and a "compelling and overriding in
terest in the information. "315 These dissenters believed that no
such showing had been made in these cases.
Thus, it was left to Justice Powell to break a four-to-four tie.
He did so by voting that the reporters in these cases must appear
and testify, while apparently refusing to join the plurality's rejec
tion of any qualified privilege. Justice Powell argued that the plu
rality's opinion required only that a "proper balance" be struck be
tween First Amendment rights and a citizen's obligation to give
relevant testimony in criminal matters. Specifically, he said that
the plurality's decision left open the possibility of a motion to
all citizens to appear and testify before grand juries when subpoenaed. 408 U.S. 665
(1972). Justice Powell, concurring, added the fifth vote on the appearance issue
when he said that the "newsman witness, like all other witnesses, will have to ap
pear...." 408 U.S. at 710.
311. Id. at 690-91.
312. "If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to
be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation
justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem. For them, it would appear
that only an absolute privilege would suffice." 408 U.S. at 702 (footnote omitted).
313. Id. at 703-05.
314. "[T]here is no 'compelling need' that can be shown which qualifies the
reporter's immunity from appearing or testifying before a grand jury, unless the re
porter himself is implicated in a crime." [d. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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quash and the entry of "an appropriate protective order" if first,
the grand jury's investigation is not being conducted in good faith
or the purpose of the subpoena is merely harassment of the press,
second, the information sought from the reporter bears "only a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investiga
tion," or third, the journalist's testimony would implicate "con
fidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law enr
IOrcement.... '~16
Thus, Justice Powell's substantive formulation of a qualified re
porter's privilege not to testify in grand jury proceedings did not
differ markedly from that urged by Justices Stewart, Brennan and
Marshall; Justice Powell did part company with the other three on
the burden of proof. He viewed the dissenters' requirement that
no reporter be compelled to testify before a grand jury and to re
veal confidential sources until the government has proven clear rel
evance, no alternative sources and a compelling and overriding in
terest as an unnecessarily heavy burden for the government to
bear. Instead, he preferred to leave the courts free to balance the
competing interests on an ad hoc basis. 317
Journalists, and their lawyers, have tended to read Branzburg
as establishing a qualified privilege not to testify in criminal mat
ters, at least where they could convince the court that, on balance,
the government's need for the information did not outweigh their
First Amendment rights. Some courts have read Branzburg the
same way. In Brown v. Commonwealth,318 for example, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that a journalist need not reveal his
identified source's confidential statements where it has not been
shown that the information was essential or relevant to the case.
The decision was premised on the Virginia court's determination
that a journalist's privilege of confidentiality yields only in cases in
which his information is relevant, essential to a fair trial and not
otherwise available. A similar result was reached in State v. St.
Peter 319 by the Vermont Supreme Court. 320
316. [d. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
317. [d. at 710.
318. 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, Gert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
319. 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974).
320. For similar adaptations of a qualified reporter's privilege along the lines of
Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg see also United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp.
229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afi'd, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), Gert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977);
Laughlin v. State, 323 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Sandstrom, 224
Kan. 573, 581 P.2d 812 (1978), Gert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); People v. Monroe,
82 Misc. 2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
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Other courts, however, have seen Branzburg as a rejection of
any privilege for journalists in criminal proceedings. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for example, has declined
to rule that journalists have a qualified privilege to refuse to reveal
confidential information relevant to a court proceeding, deciding
instead that the First Amendment imports neither a qualified or
absolute privilege. 321 More directly, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has expressly declined to read Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Branzburg as a fifth vote for a qualified privilege. In re
Farber,322 the court, seeing no disagreement between Justice
Powell's concurrence and the Branzburg plurality opinion, found
that five United States Supreme Court members concluded that
the First Amendment affords no privilege to a newsman to refuse
to testify before a grand jury about relevant information he pos
sesses, even though doing so may divulge confidential sources. The
court specifically eschewed any responsibility on its part to weigh
or to balance conflicting interests in the issue because, in its view,
a higher court performed the weighing and balancing. 323
Farber illustrates the confusion left in the wake of Branzburg.
Although refusing to find a qualified reporter's privilege not to pro
vide confidential information pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum
of a criminal defendant, the majority in Farber nevertheless held
the journalist entitled to a full hearing on the issues of relevance,
materiality and overbreadth; the decision rested on New Jersey's
News Media Privilege Act,324 a "shield law" intended to "protect
the confidentiality and secrecy of sources from which the media de
rive information. "325 The "shield law" required such a hearing, the
majority said, even though both the Sixth Amendment's and the
New Jersey Constitution's provisions guaranteeing an accused's
321. Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847, 849
(1973). It appears, however, that even Massachusetts requires that the inquiries
made of journalists be "relevant and reasonable." [d. at 321, 303 N.E.2d at 849.
There is no requirement in Massachusetts, however, that there be no other source
for the information sought or that there be a compelling need for it. Although Dow
Jones was a libel case involving the subpoenaed journalist's publication, the decision
therein was based on a previous Massachusetts decision involving a subpoena to ap
pear and testify before a grand jury, which was afforded in the Branzburg decisions.
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), afi'd, sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
322. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
323. 78 N.J. at 268, 394 A.2d at 334.
324. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1976).
325. 78 N.J. at 276, 394 A.2d at 338.
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right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses "prevails"
over the statute. 326
One of the dissenters in Farber, Justice Handler, agreed with
the majority that journalists do not have a First Amendment privi
lege to refuse to provide confidential information but nevertheless
argued that the reporter's conduct in obtaining and recoun ting
news is entitled to constitutional protection. The reporter's pursuit
and presentation of news should not needlessly be hobbled. 327 De
spite his rejection of even a qualified privilege, Justice Handler
was unwilling to sustain the reporter's contempt citation because
the record below did not establish the relevance and necessity of
the reporter's information.
The Farber opinions, then, sharply focus how Branzburg fails
to guide lower courts in reporters' privilege cases. Farber also
illustrates how far demands on journalists' information have come
since Branzburg. Whereas the reporters involved in the cases de
cided in Branzburg were asked by a grand jury to provide, essen
tially, only the names of one or a few confidential sources, the re
porter in Farber had to produce, pursuant to the defendant's
subpoena duces tecum, more than 5,000 documents, including all
his notes. For refusing to do so, the journalist spent forty days in
jail, and his newspaper paid $285,000 in fines on contempt char
ges. 328
Branzburg has also left a controversy as to its applicability to
civil cases. Although generally reluctant to require nonparty jour
nalists to reveal confidential sources or information obtained there
from in civil cases,329 the courts have done so, where the informa
tion sought was necessary to the case, other means of obtaining the
information were exhausted, and the subpoenaing party's position
was not patently frivolous. 33o The courts have more willingly
compelled journalists to reveal their sources and other confidential
326. Id. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337. The majority held that the required hearing
had taken place and that the record below was sufficient to require the journalist to
comply with the subpoena and to support his contempt citation for refusing to com
ply. Id. at 277, 394 A.2d at 339.
327. Id. at 300, 394 A.2d at 350 (Handler, J., dissenting).
328. The press after Farber, The Quill, March 1979, at 22.
329. See, e.g., Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C.
1973); Baker v. F & F Inv., 339 F. s.upp. 942 (S.D. N.Y.), afi'd, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1972), cen. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
330. Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977), cen. denied, 436 U.S.
905 (1978).
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information where the journalist or his employer is a libel defend
ant; but even there some showing has generally been required that
the information is relevant and goes to the heart of the case, other
sources have been exhausted, and the plaintiff's suit is not frivo
lous. 331 A notable exception to such a requirement, as we have
seen, is Massachusetts. 332 So far, the Burger Court has declined to
consider the issue of the reporter's privilege in civil cases, except
to the extent that it was touched upon in Herbert v. Lando,333 dis
cussed immediately below.
The case law of the journalists' privilege remains in complete
disarray, complicated further by passage of various state "shield
laws," often designed to provide protection to the media after
Branzburg. While such laws have afforded some protection for
journalists,334 they have also been narrowly construed335 and, in at
least one case,336 have been declared unconstitutional.
Most state and federal courts forced to wrestle with Branzburg
have explicitly or implicitly recognized some kind of qualified privi
lege in most circumstances, some requiring a showing of need on
the part of the party requesting the information, some performing
a balancing test. The wheels of justice have not ground to a halt, at
least not for this reason. It is accordingly hoped that the Burger
Court will take an early opportunity to rethink Branzburg and to
recognize some kind of qualified privilege of its own. At the very
least, in view of the obvious need for prompt clarification of this
entire area, it should endeavor to create order out of the chaos its
decision has caused.
331. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cerl.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Goldfeld v. Post Publishing, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1167
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1978); cf. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 91 N.M. 250,
572 P.2d 1258 (Ct. App.), cerl. denied, 91 N.M. 249, 572 P.2d 1257 (1977), cerl.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (remanding with instructions that an in camera proceed
ing be held to determine the veracity of informants' reports).
332. Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847
(1973). See also Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Ida. 288, 562 P.2d 791, cerl.
denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977) (similarly finding no privilege not to testify in either the
civil or criminal context).
333. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
334. See, e.g., JenofTv. Hearst Corp., 3 MED. L. RPTR. 1911 (D. Md. 1978).
335. See, e.g., In re Investigative File, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1865 (Mont. Dist. Ct.
1978) ("shield law" applies only to an individual reporter and not to his employer);
New York v. Le Grand, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) ("shield law"
does not apply to authors of books).
336. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354
(1976) (statutory privilege relating to news sources and information violates state
constitutional provision vesting in the supreme court exclusive power to prescribe
rules of evidence and procedure).
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Protection ofJournalists' Thoughts

In Herbert 337 the Burger Court rejected the claim of a media
libel defendant of a First Amendment privilege not to disclose dur
ing discovery matters relating to his state of mind prior to publica
tion of the alleged libel and to the editorial process that preceded
publication. The case involved a libel action filed by former Army
Colonel Anthony Herbert, who had received considerable attention
in 1969-70 after accusing his superior officers of covering up re
ports of atrocities and other war crimes in Vietnam. CBS broad
casted a report on Herbert and his accusations on February 4,
1973, in a 60 Minutes segment that Herbert claimed defamed him
and portrayed him as a liar. The program was produced and edited
by Barry Lando, who later published a related article in Atlantic
Monthly magazine.
Herbert conceded that he was a "public figure" for purposes of
the action, which meant that he could not prevail without a show
ing that the publication about him was published with actual mal
ice, which is with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis
regard of whether it was false or not. 338 Absent a showing of a
knowing falsehood, the public figure libel plaintiff must prove that
the media defendant acted recklessly or entertained serious doubts
about the truth of his publication. 339
In an effort to establish actual malice, Herbert deposed Lando
and, inter alia, asked a number of questions relating to Lando's
personal conclusions during his research and investigations regard
ing people or leads to pursue or to ignore prior to publication,
Lando's prepublication conclusions about the veracity of various
in terviewees and the truth of the facts they had provided, Lando's
conversations with his colleagues about matters to include or to ex
clude from the broadcast, and Lando's "intentions as manifested by
his decision to include or exclude certain material. "340 Lando re
fused to answer Herbert's questions in these areas on the ground
that the First Amendment precluded "inquiry into' the state of
mind of those who edit, produce, or publish, and precluded in
337. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
338. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (announcing the
"actual malice" requirement in the context of a libel action by a public official); see
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the requirement to li
bel actions by "public figures"). See text accompanying notes 354-450 infra.
339. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 732 (1968).
340. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 983 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153
(1979).
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quiry into the editorial process. "341 The trial court disagreed,342
but, on interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held, two-to-one, such matters constitution
ally privileged. 343
The Burger Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, re
versed the Second Circuit and refused to recognize the evidentiary
privilege urged by Lando. The thrust of Justice White's reasoning
was that the thoughts and editorial processes of the alleged de
famer must be open to examination in order to prove liability.344
The majority viewed the actual malice requirement as a balance
struck between the protection of press freedoms (by requiring pub
lic figure libel plaintiffs to prove knowing or reckless falsehood) and
the protection of the individual's interest in his reputation (by
permitting public figure plaintiffs to recover in libel cases upon a
showing of actual malice). It saw no reason to upset this balance by
holding that public figure libel plaintiffs could be barred from es
tablishing reckless disregard of the truth with direct evidence ob
tained through inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and conclusions
of the publisher. Inasmuch as actual malice must be proven with
convincing clarity,345 the majority felt that restricting plaintiffs'
proof to "objective evidence from which the ultimate fact could be
inferred" would be untenable. 346
Two dissenting Justices, Brennan347 and Marshall,348 argued
in favor of some kind of editorial privilege while Justice Stewart
dissented with the argument, that, constitutional privilege or no,
the material sought by Herbert was irrelevant as a matter of proce
dural law when the actual malice test is read properly. 349
The attention Colonel Herbert received when he levelled his
charges paled by comparison to the attention his Supreme Court
victory received. Media condemnation was prompt. 350 Yet Profes
341. 441 U.S. at 157 (footnote omitted).
342. 73 F.R.D. 387, 395 (S.D. N.Y. 1977).
343. 568 F.2d at 984.
344. 441 U.S. at 160.
345. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
346. 441 U.S. at 170.
347. Id. at 180-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
348. Id. at 202-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 199-202 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
350. The chairman of the Washington based Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press, for example, called the decision a " 'major defeat for the First Amend
ment.''' Brandon, Probing of journalists' 'state of mind' is permissible, Supreme
Court holds, Publishers' Auxiliary, Apr. 23, 1979, at 1. Even before the decision,
Publishers' Auxiliary editorialized: "Those who do not agree with the [Second Cir
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sor Marc Franklin has described the Herbert decision as an adher
ence to the Court's prior decisions and to the way lawyers had uni
versally conducted such litigation. He intimates that the Supreme
Court considered the issue raised by the case only to correct the
"aberrational stance" of the Second Circuit. 351 The attention and
shrill reactions given to Herbert, Franklin suggests, derived from
the media's attaching too much importance to it solely because it
was a media case, their inability to recognize the infirmities of the
Second Circuit's opinion that should have warned them of an im
pending reversal, and their failure to "distinguish between cases in
which the Court has withdrawn an existing protection from the
press and those in which novel media theories have been re
jected. "352 Viewed in a proper light, he argues, Herbert signifies
little except what the reactions to it teach us about the relationship
between the press and the legal profession. 353
The media may well have done themselves, and their lawyers,
a disservice by spreading the idea in the public, and among plain
tiffs' lawyers and judges who have not read the decision, that
Herbert represented a startling and alarming new development
that armed libel plaintiffs with weapons they never had before. To
Professor Franklin's list of reasons for the media's overreaction,

cuit] appeals court's opinion don't want a free press. They want a subservient press."
Herbert v. Lando, Publishers' Auxiliary, Nov. 13, 1978, at 6.
351. Franklin, Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1042
(1979).
352. ld. at 1051.
353. Professor Franklin's colleague, Professor Jack H. Friedenthal, believes
that Herbert may prove to have some troubling significance in the area of pretrial
discovery in civil cases. Professor Friedenthal is concerned that certain remarks by
the majority, to the effect that federal trial judges should not "neglect their power to
restrict discovery," 441 U.S. at 177, coupled with separate remarks by Justices
Powell and Marshall, "could be read to convey the vague impression that the Court
has now narrowed the traditional scope of discovery" by intimating that" 'relevancy'
for discovery purposes is dependent to some extent on a balance between the need
for information and the substantive harm resulting from disclosure." In particular,
Professor Friedenthal viewed with some alarm Justice Powell's "position that rele
vance for discovery purposes in defamation cases should be determined not by
whether information mayor may not lead to admissible evidence, but by whether,
on balance, the need for the information sought outweighs the danger that such dis
covery will interfere with the public interest in maintaining a 'free flow of news and
commentary:" 441 U.S. at 179-80 (Powell, J., concurring), and Justice MarshalJ'd
"closely analogous position with regard to discovery of information outside the scope
of the very narrow constitutional privilege he would impose." Professor Friedenthal
could find "little justification and must potential harm" in such a balancing approach
to relevancy in pretrial discovery. Friedenthal, Herbert v. Lando: A Note on Discov
ery, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1061, 1062 (1979).
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however, one can add the paranoia that the various anti-press cases
collected in this article have created in the media. If Herbert had
been but a single raindrop falling from an otherwise sunny sky, it
no doubt would not have received the media outcry that it did.
But as one in a series of drops deftly administered in the classic
water torture, it produced automatic cries of anguish disproportion
ate to the pain it produced itself. Standing alone, however,
Herbert is "unr~markable," both because it plows no new ground
and because it retains a sensible balance of the interests involved
in public figure media libel cases.
The media may take some perverted comfort, however, in one
thing: It appears that Herbert will apply to a relatively small num
ber of cases because, as shown in part V, the Burger Court has
drastically reduced the number of libel plaintiffs having to prove
"actual malice."

V.

LIBEL-THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE

The Burger and Warren Courts' respective approaches to the
concept of a constitutional privilege in libel cases involving media
defendants present a striking contrast. While the Warren Court in
itiated and consistently expanded the notion that certain constitu
tional protections pertain to the media in defamation cases, the
Burger Court has seized virtually every available opportunity to
constrict these constitutional protections, denying they exist in all
but the most extreme cases.
Prior to 1964, libelous statements generally were viewed as
beyond the scope of the First Amendment, enjoying no constitu
tional protection regardless of the speaker's status. In 1942, Justice
Murphy summarized the prevailing wisdom in his oft-quoted
passage from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire: 354
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult
ing or "fighting" words . . . . It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the so
cial interest in order and morality. 355
354.
355.

315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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Through its landmark decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,356 the Warren Court endeavored to put an end to that
view as it applied to libelous statements by the media. Sullivan in
volved a libel action brought by the police commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama, against The New York Times and others
arising from an .advertisement appearing in the Times. The adver
tisement, placed by a prominent civil rights organization, attacked
police practices in Alabama and solicited contributions for the or
ganization's programs. Certain statements in the advertisement
referring to the police commissioner's performance of his official
duties contained minor factual errors. The Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed a jury verdict for the police commissioner, stating that li
belous publications are not protected by the First Amendment. 357
The Warren Court, through Justice Brennan, reversed, declaring
that libel actions against the press must be judged by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment. 358 The majority opinion con
cluded that a public official is prohibited from recovering damages
from the media for defamatory falsehoods relating to official con
duct unless he can prove that the statement was made with actual
malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard as to whether it was false. 359 Justice Brennan viewed this
conclusion as being consistent with a "background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. "360 That commit
ment, he said, must protect even erroneous statements if freedom
of expression is to have the "breathing space" it requires. 361
While the holding of Sullivan was limited to defamation ac
tions by public officials against the media for statements relating to
official conduct, its implications were enormous. For. the first time,
libel judgments against the media, at least in certain circum
stances, were required to meet some constitutional standards. The
most remarkable aspect of the Sullivan decision, in view of what
356. 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
357. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 676, 144 So. 2d 25, 40
(1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 254, 256-58 (1964).
358. 376 U.S. at 269.
359. ld. at 279-80. Moreover, such actual malice must be established with con
vincing clarity. ld. at 285-86. The Court later explained that reckless disregard for
the truth requires at least sufficient evidence that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his ·publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968).
360. 376 U.S. at 270.
361. ld. at 272.
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has since taken place, is that the only dispute among the Justices
was whether the constitutional privilege recognized therein was
qualified or absolute; there was no question that some constitu
tional protection existed. Moreover, the Warren Court wasted little
time in expanding the new Sullivan doctrine to other contexts. The
Court extended its constitutional analysis to cases involving crimi
nal libel,362 appointed public official plaintiffs,363 public figure
plaintiffs 364 and candidates for public office. 365
Sullivan declined to determine how low in the government hi
erarchy the public official designation would extend, leaving open
the question of which officials trigger application of the actual mal
ice standard. 366 Later decisions of the Warren Court, however, left
a clear impression that constitutional protection of the media in
cases involving public officials or public figures required broad con
struction of those classifications. As a result, the constitutional priv
ilege came to be extended to actions by such public officials as school
teachers,367 school principals,368 auditors of municipal utilities, 369
police officers,370 court-appointed attorneys for indigents,371 county
motor pool administrators,372 social workers,373 and companies
with government contracts. 374 Similarly, the category of public fig
ures has been held to include Nobel Prize winners,375 businessmen
who hold political party offices,376 college athletic coaches,377 per
362. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
363. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
364. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Public figures were
defined as persons who were not public officials but who commanded substantial in
dependent public interest at the time of publication. Id. at 154.
365. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
366. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
367. Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1978).
368. Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967).
369. Kruteck v. Schimmel, 27 App. Div. 2d 837, 278 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1967).
370. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S.
279 (1971); Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 2d 239, 228
N.E.2d 172 (1967).
371. Steere v. Cupp., 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1138 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1978).
372. Clawson v. Longview Publishing Co., 91 Wash. 2d 408, 589 P.2d 1223
(1979).
373. Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1978).
374. Artic Co. v. Loudoun Times Mirror, 4 MED. L. RPTR. 1947 (E.D. Va.
1978).
375. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967).
376. News Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166 (Del. 1967).
377. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v.
Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (former professional basketball player cur
rently engaged in coaching).
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sons claiming to have cures for maladies,378 former Playboy play
mates,379 the sons of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg,380 persons with
alleged ties to organized crime,381 and prominent dabblers in state
politics. 382
The scope of constitutional protection for libelous statements
by the media reached its apparent pinnacle in 1971 with the plural
ity opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 383 the first signifi
cant media libel case to be decided by the Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Burger. Rosenbloom stood, for a time, for the propo
sition that purportedly libelous statements by the media concern
ing matters of general or public interest enjoyed constitutional pro
tection subject to the Sullivan actual malice test of liability
regardless of the plaintiff's status. The plurality of three Justices384
felt that the plaintiff's status bore little relation to the values pro
tected by the First Amendment and that media discussions of mat
ters of public concern should be protected even when they in
volved little known persons. The two other Justices comprising the
majority concurred in the result for very different reasons. 38S Jus
tices Harlan, Stewart and Marshall dissented from the plurality
opinion on the ground that the public interest test was un
workable.
By 1974, following the appointments of Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, the balance of opinion with respect to the scope of con
stitutional protection in media libel cases had clearly shifted. If
Rosenbloom stood at the summit, the climb down began with
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,386 in which three significant develop
ments occurred. First, the majority explicitly rejected the plurality
view in Rosenbloom that media statements concerning matters of
public or general interest were entitled to Sullivan protection re
gardless of the plaintiff's status. The constitutional privilege an
378. Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 1973).
379. Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978).
380. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
38l. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
382. Whitaker v. Denver Post, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 60 (1975), "~1?e,.sed sub nom.
Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977).
·383. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
384. The three Justices were Justice Brennan, author of the opinion, Chief Jus
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
385. Justice Black maintained his position that the Constitution permits no lia
bility for defamation in any case. Id. at 57. Justice White felt that it was not neces
sary to reach the plurality's view because, in his mind, the ·plaintiff in Rosenbloom
was a public official. Id. at 59. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision.
386. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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nounced in Sullivan was held to apply only in cases involving a
public official or public figure plaintiff.
Second, the Court began a process it has since pursued with
relish: greatly limiting the scope of those two categories so that
fewer and fewer libel plaintiffs will fit into them. Public figures,
the Gertz majority said, are of two kinds: (1) persons with such
"pervasive fame or notoriety" that they may be considered public
figures for all purposes; and (2) persons who have thrust them
selves into the vortex of some specific public controversy, thus be
coming public figures for a limited range of issues. 387 The plaintiff
in Gertz, a prominent Chicago attorney long active in community
and professional affairs and a publisher of several books and articles
on legal subjects,388 was found to fit under neither of those
standards. (In sharp contrast, a local real estate developer engaged
in controversial negotiations with a city council had been found by
the Warren Court to be a public figure. 389 Clearly, times had
changed.)
Finally, the majority in Gertz did recognize some limited con
stitutional protection for the media even in private figure plaintiff
cases. While the states need not apply the Sullivan actual malice
test in such cases, they may not impose liability on the media for
defamation without some showing of fault. Before liability is estab
lished, the states, at a minimum, must require a showing that the
media defendant has been negligent. 390 As a result, the states have
387. Id. at 351.
388. Id. One author believes that Gertz would have been considered a public
figure under pre-Gertz decisions because he had authored four books, thousands of
articles, had been the subject of over 40 articles in Chicago papers, and had made
many television and radio appearances. Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 222
(1976) (footnotes omitted).
389. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). Although
the plaintiff in Greenbelt was also a state legislator who represented a neighboring
county, the allegedly libelous statement about him did not involve his performance
in public office.
390. 418 U.S. at 347-48. The majority also declared, however, that states may
not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages when liability is not based on
at least a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at
349. It has been consistently held, however, that, when actual malice has been
shown by a private figure plaintiff, he may recover punitive damages. See Maheu v.
Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Appleyard v. Transamerican Press,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Buckley
v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Davis
v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This appears to be true even if the forum
state does not require a showing of actual malice to establish liability.
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imposed widely varying standards of fault in defamation cases be
tween private individual plaintiffs and media defendants. The
standard of liability ranges from negligence, 391 to gross negli
gence,392 to malice,393 and to some form of actual malice. 394
Justice Powell wrote, and Justice Rehnquist adopted, the
Gertz majority opinion. The other two Nixon appointees, who
had formed two-thirds of the plurality in Rosenbloom, abruptly
switched their positions in Gertz. Justice Blackmun, in a separate
concurring opinion, announced that, had his vote not been needed
to create a majority in Gertz, he would have adhered to his view in
Rosenbloom. Believing that the Court's sharp divisions in
Rosenbloom had left too much uncertainty and that a definitive rul
ing was paramount, he abandoned Rosenbloom and joined the
Gertz majority. 395
Chief Justice Burger went even further. Although he had sub
scribed to the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom that the actual mal
ice test should be applied to all publications involving matters of
public or general concern regardless of the plaintiff's status, he dis
sented in Gertz and announced that he would have reinstated a
jury verdict based on a libel per se instruction. 396 The Chief Just
391. E.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216
(1977); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161
(1975); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976). One court in
Connecticut found that Gertz permitted a return to state law as it existed prior to
Rosenbloom in private figure cases. The court seemingly adopted a negligence
standard, but the issue is not settled in that state. See Corbett v. Register Publishing
Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (Super. Ct. 1975).
392. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d
569,379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
393. Direct Import Buyers Ass'n v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975) de
fined malice as simply an improper motive such as a desire to do harm or that the
defendant did not honestly believe his statements to be true or that the publication
was excessive. Id. at 1042.
394. E.g., Patten v. Smith, 360 N.E.2d 233 (1977); LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune
Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Newspaper Publishing Corp. v.
Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976). While Colorado has adopted an actual
malice standard requiring a showing that the defendant knew his statement was false
or published with reckless disregard for the truth, Colorado's requirement in private
figure cases is not the same as that set forth in Sullivan and its progeny. Reckless
disregard in Colorado means only acting "wantonly, with indifference to conse
quences." Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. App. 86,99 n.2, 538 P.2d
450, 457 (1975). In adopting this standard, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly re
jected the "serious doubts as to the truth of his publication" definition of reckless
disregard applicable to public official and public figure cases. St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); see note 6 supra.
395. 418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
396. [d. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ice rejected a negligence standard in private figure cases as being
too vague and without guiding precedent. He urged instead that
the law be allowed to continue to evolve as it had up to that point
with respect to private citizens. 397
While Gertz is generally viewed as significant because of its
rejection of Rosenbloom and its imposition of a fault standard for
private figure plaintiffs, the decision is also important because it
narrowed the definition of public figure for purposes of requiring a
showing of actual malice. One commentator rightly concluded that
Gertz contracted the class of public figures and signaled a narrow
ing of the public figure category.398 Gertz continued to recognize
the two major characteristics of public figures identified in Curtis
v. Butts 399 and its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker: 40o
public figures ordinarily can gain access to communications media
in order to rebut defamatory charges, and they have voluntarily ex
posed themselves in a meaningful sense to an enhanced risk of def
amation. Gertz, however, differed in its application of these criteria
to the facts. 401 The clear implication of Gertz is that the plaintiff
will not incur public figure status without voluntarily seeking pub
licity 402 with respect to the subject matter of the purportedly libel
ous article403 unless his name is already a household word.
The descent begun in Gertz accelerated two years later with
Time, Inc. v. Firestone. 404 Time magazine reported that Russell
Firestone had obtained a divorce from his wife on grounds of adul
tery. The divorce court's record was confused, but it appeared that
the actual ground for the divorce decree was lack of domestication.
Mrs. Firestone brought and won a libel suit against Time, Inc. Al
though she clearly had access to the communications media and
had voluntarily opened herself to publicity in a meaningful
397. Id.
398. Robertson, supra note 388, at 221, 222.
399. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
400. Id.
401. Robertson, supra note 388, at 221-22. See note 378 supra and accompa
nying text.
402. Robertson, supra note 388, at 222-23.
403. While Gertz purported to recognize the possibility that involuntary in
volvement in a matter of public or general concern may make a plaintiff a public fig
ure, it clearly left the door open only a crack. Hypothetically, it may be possible for
someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the
instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. 418 U.S. at
345.
.
404. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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sense,405 the Burger Court found that she was not a public figure
and had to shoulder the burden of proving only negligence. 406 It
reached this conclusion by adding a new wrinkle to the general
analysis: access to the media and voluntary exposure to publicity
make a plaintiff a public figure only if the subject matter of the ar
ticle is a genuine public controversy. Dissolution of a marriage was
found to be beyond the purview of public controversy as referred
to in Gertz, even though some members of the reading public
would be interested in the topic. 407 Thus, a new threshold ques
tion was added, and Rosenbloom was not only in disgrace but
turned on its head. Under Firestone, if a matter was not of legiti
mate public interest according to the Court's standards, the actual
malice test would not be applicable, regardless of the plaintiff's sta
tuS. 408
The latest, though probably not the final, blows to the applica
bility of the actual malice test came in 1979 with Wolston v. Read
er's Digest Association 409 and Hutchinson v. Proxmire. 410 Wolston
concerned a book published in 1974 which asserted that the plain
tiff was among a group of persons convicted of espionage, falsifying
information, perjury, contempt charges following espionage indict
405. Mary Firestone sought publicity and engaged in activities that attracted
the attention of the public. With her husband a member of America's wealthier in
dustrial families, she was prominent among the "400" of Palm Beach society, and an
active member of the "sporting set." Moreover, she did not shy away from publicity
and even subscribed to a press clipping service. The Firestones' marital difficulties
were known and their divorce suit became a cause celebre in social circles across the
country. The divorce trial lasted 17 months, attracted national news coverage and
fostered numerous articles in the Miami and Palm Beach newspapers. During the
course of these proceedings, Mary Firestone held several press conferences. Note,
Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. REv. 157, 172 (1977)
(footnotes omitted). See notes 401-02 supra and accompanying text.
406. Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, adopted by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, filed a con
curring opinion that did not discuss the public figure issue. Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall dissented. The newly appointed Justice Stevens did not take part in
the decision.
407. 424 U.S. at 454.
408. The majority tried to portray Mrs. Firestone as a private figure in any
event, arguing that she was compelled to go to court to seek a divorce so her in
volvement was not voluntary. Id. Moreover, her few press conferences did not make
her a public figure because they could not have been calculated to affect the out
come of the matter in controversy, the divorce proceedings. Id. at n.3. The Court's
analysis is unsatisfying, however, ignoring as it does the totality of Mrs. Firestone's
public activities.
409. 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979).
410. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979).
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ments or of fleeing to the Soviet bloc to avoid prosecution. 411 Al
though the plaintiff had been convicted of contempt of court in
1958 for failing to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet
espionage, he had never been indicted for any of the other listed
offenses.
Finding the plaintiff a public figure 412 who had failed to estab
lish the publisher's actual malice, the district court granted, and
the court of appeals affirmed, summary judgment for the defen
dant. In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Burger Court
reversed, concluding that the plaintiff was a private figure so that a
lesser standard of liability than actual malice was required. 413
At least three significant points in the Court's analysis led to
this conclusion. First, the Court explicitly rejected the contention
"that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically be
comes a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range
of issues relating to his conviction. "414 While perhaps surprising to
some that this Court would so solicitously treat the rights of crimi
nals in preference to the rights of others, and while an argument
can be constructed that persons who engage in certain types of
criminal conduct have voluntarily thrust themselves into a matter
of legitimate public concern, this determination is at least easily
understood and applied. Moreover, it probably does not present a
tremendous problem to those who may wish to publish articles
about highly visible criminal figures engaged in illegal activity of
wide public interest. Presumably, there is more about them than
their convictions that makes them public figures.
What is disturbing, however, is the reasoning used to justify
this decision. Plaintiff Wolston, the majority found, did not seek
public attention to influence the resolution of the issues involved,
nor were his activities calculated to draw attention to himself in or
411. 99 S. Ct. at 2703.
412. The district court concluded that the plaintiff, by failing to appear before
the grand jury and subjecting himself to a citation for contempt, became involved in
a public controversy that invited attention and comment, and created in the public
an interest in his connection with espionage. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F.
Supp. 167, 177 n.33 (D.D.C.), aII'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2701
(1979). The court of appeals found that, by refusing to comply with the subpoena,
the plaintiff "stepped center front into the spotlight focused on the investigation of
Soviet espionage." 578 F.2d at 431. In short, by his voluntary action he invited atten
tion and comment in connection with the public questions involved in the investiga
tion of espionage. Id.
413. 99 S. Ct. at 2704.
414. Id. at 2708. "To hold otherwise would create an 'open season' for all who
sought to defame persons convicted of a crime." Id. at 2708-09.
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der to invite public comment. In short, the majority found no basis
whatsoever for concluding that Wolston had relinquished his inter
est in protecting his own name. 415 One wonders how many persons
engaged in criminal -activity conduct themselves so as to draw at
tention to themselves or to influence the public. 416 The message to
reporters investigating persons allegedly connected with organized
crime appears to be that, despite the high degree of public concern
with such matters, the subjects of investigation are private figures;
therefore, the actual malice standard will be unavailable should the
reporter err. If Gertz endangered the involuntary public figure
species,417 the reasoning, if not the holding, of Wolston appears to
have rendered it extinct. 418
The second significant point of the Wolston decision is its
treatment of what constitutes a matter of public controversy, an
important question since Firestone. 419 In a footnote to his
discussion of the involuntary nature of Wolston's involvement in
the investigation of Soviet espionage in the United States, Justice
Rehnquist offered this analysis:
It is difficult to determine with precISIon the "public con
troversy" into which . . . [Wolston] is alleged to have thrust
himself. Certainly, there was no controversy or debate in 1958
about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in the

415. Id. at 2708. Wolston's failure to appear before the grand jury was appar
ently due to poor health. The opinion suggests that, had Wolston invited a citation
for contempt with the intention of using it to create public discussion about the in
vestigation, it might have been a different case. Id.
416. See Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga.),
aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff, identified in the defendant's article
as a "California mobster" with underworld ties, argued that he was a private figure
because he had not thrust himself voluntarily into the vortex of any public issue. Al
though the plaintiff had never been convicted of any crime, he admitted that he was
personally acquainted with many of the persons identified by the staff at a United
States Senate Committee investigating organized crime, as members of the under
world. He had also been the subject of governmental investigations and criminal
prosecutions. He had been mentioned in over 40 articles relating to alleged under
world contacts and involvements. The court concluded that the plaintiff had "volun
tarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and comment" and was
therefore a public figure. Id. at 445.
417. See note 403 supra and accompanying text.
418. In the view of Justices Blackmun and Brennan, the Court seemingly held
that "a person becomes a limited-issue public figure only if he literally or figura
tively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate a particular view," a definition of "public fig
ure" they believed to be unnecessarily "restrictive." 99 S. Ct. at 2709 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
419. See note 407 supra and accompanying text.
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United States; all responsible United States citizens understand
ably were and are opposed to it.420

The implications of pennitting any court to decide that there
can be no controversy because no "responsible" citizen could take
a particular view are enormous. Had Walston been handed down
in 1965, one can easily envision a lower court picking up on Justice
Rehnquist's language and detennining that there was no contro
versy over the Vietnam War because no "responsible" citizen could
oppose the decision of his President to commit United States
troops to the fight against communism. Moreover, Justice Rehn
quist's broad definition of the controversy involved in Walston in
vites absurd results. One court could detennine that SALT II is
not a matter of controversy because there can be no debate about
the undesirability of a nuclear holocaust. Another court could rea
son that SALT II is uncontroversial because there can be no debate
about the desirability of keeping a strong deterrent to Soviet mili
tary might.
Third, the Court declined to decide the issue of whether the
passage of time may convert a public figure into a private figure.
Because the issue was not pursued in Walston and because the ma
jority concluded that he was not a public figure even in 1958, the
Court did not decide "whether or when an individual who was
once a public figure may lose that status by the passage of
time. "421 The Justices, filing separate opinions, however, did ex
press themselves on the question. In dissent, Justice Brennan ar
gued that Wolston qualified as a public figure "for the limited pur
pose of comment on his connection with, or involvement in,
espionage in the 1940's and 1950'S"422 and that mere lapse of time
was not decisive of his status. 423 Justice Blackmun, joined by Just
ice Marshall in a concurring opinion, argued that the lapse sixteen
years rendered consideration of Wolston's original public figure sta
tus unnecessary.424 Any argument that Wolston had assumed the
420. 99 S. Ct. at 2707 n.8. The majority was willing to accept, arguendo, the
publisher's characterization of the public controversy as involving the propriety of
the law enforcement officials' conduct in investigating and prosecuting suspected So
viet agents because it was clear that Wolston failed to meet the Gertz public figure
criteria. The majority did not think much of this definition of the controversy in
volved. Justice Brennan,in dissent, adopted the court of appeals' view that the is
sues of national security and Wolston's involvement in espionage were legitimate
topics of debate in 1958 and remain vital today. Id. at 2710.
421. Id. at 2707 n.7.
422. Id. at 2710 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 578 F.2d at 431).

423. Id.
424. Id. at 2709 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

1980]

MEDIA LAW PERSPECTIVE

667

risk of public scrutiny was negated by his deliberate efforts to re
gain anonymity during the sixteen years intervening between his
conviction and publication. 425 Quite obviously, the passage of time
issue remains unresolved.
Finally, there is Hutchinson v. Proxmire,426 a case that did not
involve a media defendant but that nonetheless further restricted
the !fleaning of public figure in media defamation cases. 427
Hutchinson was a recipient of grants from the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and the Navy for his work as a
research behavioral scientist. The grants Hutchinson had received
to study aggressive behavior patterns of certain animals approached
half a million dollars. NASA and the Office of Naval Research re
ceived one of Senator William Proxmire's "Golden Fleece of the
Month" awards, made by the Senator to publicize what he viewed
to be examples of grossly wasteful government spending. Various
communications by the Senator and members of his staff concern
ing this particular award included disparaging comments about
Hutchinson's work and its value. As a result, Hutchinson sued
Proxmire for defamation. 428 Both the United States District Court
in Wisconsin 429 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit430 had ruled, inter alia, that Hutchinson was a
public figure,431 that the Sullivan test, therefore, applied, and that
Hutchinson had not proven actual malice.
The Burger Court's decision in Hutchinson sent new shivers

425. Id. As a result of this analysis one might be considered a public figure.
during contemporaneous reporting of an event, yet not be a public figure for pur
poses of later historical commentary on the same occurrence. Justice Blackmun did
not object to subjecting historians to greater liability for a defamation because histo
rians work under different conditions than their media counterparts. Id. at 2709-10.
Cf. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (the sons of Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg were held to be public figures for purposes of a defamation action con
cerning a book published 20 years after their parents' executions there being no sug
gestion that the passage of those 20 years may have made any difference to the plain
tiffs' status).
426. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979).
427. The Supreme Court has never decided whether the Sullivan standard
applies to cases involving non-media defendants. Its conclusion that the plaintiff in
Hutchinson was neither a public official nor a public figure made it unnecessary to
decide that question. Id. at 2687 n.16.
428. Id. at 2677-78..
429. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311 (w.n. Wis. 1977), afi'd, 579
F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. III (1979).
430. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111
(1979).
431. The district court also found Hutchinson to be a public official. 431 F.
Supp. at 1327-28. The court of appeals did not decide that issue.
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down the spines of media lawyers for at least two reasons. First, al
though not called upon to discuss it, the majority said that it felt
constrained to cast some doubt on the notion that summary judg
. ments in favor of defamation defendants ought to be the rule,
rather than the exception, in public figure and public official cases
where actual malice has not been shown. Because proof of actual
malice calls into question the defendant's state of mind, the major
ity reasoned, it does not readily lend itself to summary disposi
tion. 432
Second, Hutchinson radically contracted the public figure cate
gory and cast new doubt on the scope of the public official class. At
the time of the award, Hutchinson was director of research at the
Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital, operated by the Michigan State
Department of Mental Health. During most of the time of his re
search, he was also an adjunct professor at Western Michigan Uni
versity. Over a seven year period, while in these and other public
employment positions, Hutchinson applied for and received
$500,000 in grants from the federal government. 433
The proper expenditure of government funds is a matter of
public concern, which has become more pronounced in recent
years. 434 Nevertheless, eight Supreme Court Justices agreed435
432. 99 S. Ct. at 2680 n.9. The majority quickly noted, however, that the pos
ture of the case did not require concern with the propriety of dealing with such com
plex issues by summary judgment. ld.
Nevertheless, the footnote has had its apparently intended effect. In Nader v. de
Toledano, 5 MED. L. RPTR. 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1979), for example, the District of Co
lumbia Circuit recognized the emphaSis placed by courts and commentators on the
utility of summary judgment in First Amendment libel cases to avoid harassment of
the press and promote free speech by doing away with vexatious defamation claims
by public figures before they become unnecessarily costly to the defendant.
Nonetheless, the circuit court overturned a summary judgment granted a newspaper
columnist against a public figure plaintiff, quoting the infamous footnote nine and re
marking that the Supreme Court had recently sounded a note of caution in the area
of summary judgments. Id. at 1558.
Similarly, in Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 5 MED. L. RPTR. 2021
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), summary judgment was denied a media defendant whose defense
was that the statements he made concerning a public figure plaintiff were made
without actual malice. The court, again citing footnote nine, ruled that the actual
malice defense could not be decided at the time because footnote nine had cast
doubt on the propriety of granting summary judgment where actual malice had been
alleged. The court, still left open the possibility of a future summary judgment
motion following additional, though unspecified, discovery. ld. at 2024, 2025.
433. 99 S. Ct. at 2678.
434. Expenditure of public funds is not a controversy if one follows Justice
Rehnquist's reasoning in Walston and concludes that there is no controversy here
because all responsible citizens oppose government waste. That is precisely what
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with Chief Justice Burger's opinion that Hutchinson was not a pub
lie figure. The majority opinion, noting that the court of appeals
had not determined Hutchinson's status as a public official, ex
pressed no opinion. It expressed the view that the category of pub
lic officials cannot be thought to include all public employees. 436
The Court, in 1966, said that the public official designation applies
at the very least to those who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs.437 The term "public official" has been said to
include those public employees whose positions are so important
that the public has an independent interest in the office holders'
qualifications and performance. 438 These definitions guided lower
court opinions for thirteen years.
By finding that a director of research at a state mental hospital
who was also an adjunct professor at a state university is not a pub
lic official for purposes of application of the Sullivan standard, the
Court has brought into serious question the vitality of numerous
cases finding school teachers, school principals, police officers and
other public employees to be public officials for libel purposes. 439
The breadth of the term public official has been greatly contracted
by Hutchinson, further limiting the application of the Sullivan
standard. Uncertainty in the newsroom has correspondingly in
creased.
In addition, the Hutchinson opinion continued to erode the in
voluntary public figure concept, already diminished by Wolston.
The district court's and court of appeals' conclusion that
Hutchinson was a public figure was premised on two grounds:
Hutchinson's successful application for federal grants had been re
ported in local newspapers; and he had access to the media, as
witnessed by publication of his response to the Golden Fleece
award. 440 The Supreme Court was unimpressed with either
the Court did, if Hutchinson were a public figure, everyone receiving one of the
myriad public grants would be classified as such. [d. at 2688.
435. Although Justice Brennan dissented from the result, he did not do so on
the basis of the public figure issue. His view was that Proxmire was shielded from li
ability by the speech or debate clause. [d. at 2689. Justice stewart joined the majority
opinion 'in its entirety excepting only a footnote dealing with the application of
speech or debate clause immunity to communications between members of Congress
and federal agencies. [d. at 2688-89 (Stewart, J., concurring).
436. [d. at 2680 n.8.
437. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,85 (1966).
438. [d. at 86.
439. See notes 367-374 supra and accompanying text.
440. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
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ground. The Court pointed out that Hutchinson's published writ
ings reached a relatively small category of professionals concerned
with research in human behavior and did not become a matter of
controversy until Senator Proxmire brought them to the public's at
tention through his announcement of the Golden Fleece award.
Hutchinson's alleged defamers, the Court reasoned, could not cre
ate a defense for themselves by making Hutchinson into a public
figure. 441 Second, the Court held that Hutchinson had not thrust
himself into a public controversy because no controversy existed.
He reasoned that almost every member of the general public was
concerned about government spending. 442 Neither Hutchinson's
applications for federal grants nor his publications in professional
journals invited sufficient public attention and comment to trans
form him into a public figure. 443 No one dissented from the con
clusion that Hutchinson was not a public figure and that the consti
tutional protection afforded by the Sullivan standard did not apply.
It bears repeating that the Sullivan standard was devised to as
sure that debate on public issues be "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open. "444 Constitutional protection of even erroneous state
ments made in the context of such debate is necessary in order to
guarantee that freedoms of expression have the "breathing space"
they need to survive. 445 To suggest, as Hutchinson does, that com
ment about the performance of public officials in their official
capacities merits the strongest available constitutional protection,
yet comment about the expenditure of public funds does not war
rant r'such protection, creates a curious line of demarcation. If any
thing stirs the blood of the American public more than malfeasance
in public office, it is the waste of taxpayers' dollars. Surely the wis
dom of any governmental expenditure must be the subject of
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate. 446 It is no answer
that discussions of particular expenditures are not controversies be
cause everyone opposes waste. The subject of debate is whether
the particular expenditure is wasteful, not whether waste is unde
sirable.
A plurality of the Supreme Court became convinced, after
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

ld.
See note 434 supra and accompanying text.
99 S. Ct. at 2688.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
ld. at 271-72.
ld. at 270.
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only four years of experience with the public figure category, that
focus on the plaintiff's status bore little relation to the values pro
tected by the First Amendment. The distinction that public figures
have voluntarily exposed themselves to public inspection while pri
vate individuals have kept their lives hidden from view was re
jected as a legal fiction. 447 The three Justices making up the
Rosenbloom plurality determined that the Sullivan standard should
be extended to all matters of public or general concern without re
gard to the eminency or anonymity of the persons involved. 448
Although a majority of the Court has rejected the plurality
opinion in Rosenbloom on repeated occasions,449 and two of the
three Justices making up the Rosenbloom plurality have switched
their positions,450 the propriety of the Rosenbloom approach is
made abundantly clear by the result reached in Hutchinson.
Wrestling with the ponderous question of whether Hutchinson in
vited sufficient attention to his applications for federal grants to
warrant imposition of an actual malice standard of liability for state
ments made about him is misdirected. Instead, the Court should
follow the Rosenbloom plurality and focus on the values the First
Amendment is designed to protect. Since discussion of public ex
penditures goes to the heart of those values, Dr. Hutchinson
should not complain if comments about his use of federal money
are given the highest constitutional protection. It seems just as fair
to expect recipients of federal grants to assume the risk of public
debate as it is to expect public officials to incur such risk.
A return to the Rosenbloom standard would represent a re
vival of rationality. What constitutes a matter of general interest or
concern needs to be refined first, to provide certainty as to which
matters should receive maximum constitutional protection. The
Court may wish to establish a line between "concerns" and "con
troversies" to protect the Mrs. Firestones of the world to some de
gree. It may well be that discussion of a wealthy couple's marital
problems does not require the same protection as do discussions of
official malfeasance or public expenditures. But if "controversy" is
to be the standard, the Court will have to do better in defining it
than it has in Wolston and Hutchinson.
447. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 47,48.
448. Id. at 44.
449. E.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. at 2708; Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346.
450. See notes 395 & 396 supra and accompanying text.
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INVASIONS OF PRIVACY

Since Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren crafted the
tort ninety years ago,451 invasion of privacy has become a burgeon
ing field, to the alarm of media lawyers. 452 Privacy law has grown
from its humble beginnings to encompass at least four widely di
vergent subcategories: Appropriation of likeness,453 publication of
private facts,454 intrusion455 and false light. 456 A fifth category, the
proprietary right of publicity, is now developing as a spin-off from
appropriation of likeness. 457 Despite the expansion of the invasion
of privacy tort, the United States Supreme Court has had few occa
sions to analyze the nature and scope of the tort and its various cat
egories.

451. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
452. See, e.g., Abrams, The Press, Privacy and the Constitution, N.Y. Times
Magazine, Aug. 21, 1977, at 11; Schwartz, Danger: Pendulum Swinging, 239 THE
ATLANTIC 29 (1977).
453. One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the likeness or name of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Friedan v.
Friedan, 414 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (use of photograph to promote magazine
sales); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 App. Div. 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975), afi'd,
39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976) (use of photograph to pro
mote subscriptions).
454. One who gives publicity to matters concerning the private life of another,
of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable man, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)
(description of former celebrity's current private life in "Where Are They Now?" fea
ture); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (news
photograph revealing plaintiff's undergarments); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4
Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (description of reformed ex
convict's eleven year old crime).
455. One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another, or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy if the intrusion would be highly offensive to the rea
sonable man. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (harassment
by photographer); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (entry by
journalists into private office under false pretenses); LeMistrol, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 61 App. Div. 2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978) (uninvited entry of
restaurant by television reporter and camera crew).
456. One who gives to another publicity that places the other before the public
in a false light of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable man is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Wilson, 2 MED. L. RPTR. 2008,
2010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (unauthorized biography containing "false and fabricated"
facts); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (false state
ment that plaintiff signed political nomination petition). False light privacy differs
from defamation in that, in the former, proof of harm to plaintiff's reputation is not
required.
457. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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"False Light" Privacy

The principal Supreme Court privacy OpInIOn preceding the
Burger Court decisions was a false light privacy case, Time, Inc. v.
Hill. 458 In Hill, the Warren Court purported to hold that the con
stitutional protections afforded to the media in defamation cases ex
tended to false light privacy actions as well. Hill temporarily
pushed the media's protection in false light privacy cases ahead of
the protection available in defamation cases because it anticipated
the later plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. 459 In Hill, the Court
held that, absent proof of actual malice, the First Amendment pre
cluded redress of false reports of matters of public interest, regard
less of the plaintiff's status as a public or private figure. 460
Because the Rosenbloom standard has been repudiated in def
amation cases and the Burger Court has held that only public offi
cial and public figure libel plaintiffs need prove actual malice,461
the continuing vitality of Hill in private figure plaintiff false light
cases is in some doubt. When presented with the opportunity to
do to Hill what it had done to Rosenbloom, however, the Burger
Court declined to do so. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. ,462
decided after Gertz, involved a false light privacy action by a
mother and son whose husband and father, respectively, had been
killed in a bridge collapse. By almost any standard, and certainly
by the Gertz standard, the plaintiffs in Cantrell were private fig
ures. The article which the defendants published about the impact
of the death on the plaintiffs' lives contained several admitted inac
curacies and false statements about the plaintiffs. An Ohio jury,
after receiving an actual malice instruction,463 awarded the plain
tiffs damages under a false light theory. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed on the ground that the evi
dence was insufficient to support a finding of actual malice. 464
The Burger Court, had it been so inclined, could have used
Cantrell as the vehicle to announce that proof of actual malice was
458. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
459. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
460. 385 U.S. at 387-88. Actual malice is defined as knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth.
461. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 334; see notes 485-488 infra and
accompanying text.
462. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
463. Id. at 250 n.3.
464. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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not required of private false light privacy plaintiffs even in cases
involving matters of public interest. Instead, it noted that no one
had objected to the trial court's actual malice instruction465 and
found no prejudice, even assuming error in the instruction. The
Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's decision of insufficient ac
tual malice evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. 466 It reinstated
the verdict, and the plaintiffs prevailed even under a standard that
may have been too high. The Court declined to decide whether
the Hill actual malice standard, or a more relaxed standard, applied
in false light cases between media defendants and private individ
uals. 467
Considering the Burger Court's refinements of the constitu
tional privilege in defamation cases, it is probable that the Court
would have seized the opportunity to do away with the actual mal
ice standard for private figure false light plaintiffs had the Cantrell
jury found for the defendant under its actual malice instruction.
The Court's admirable restraint leaves some hope for the media.
Even if the Rosenbloom standard468 is never revitalized in defama
tion cases, several reasons exist for requiring a higher standard of
proof in false light privacy cases than in defamation cases.
First, the injuries redressed by the two torts are quite differ
ent. By definition, defamation assails a plaintiff's reputation and
arouses "'hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy or shame,' and the
like."469 False light invasions of privacy, on the other hand, focus
not on the impact of the publication on the plaintiff's reputation
but on the plaintiffs internal reactions to it.470 Second, it is proba
bly easier for a journalist developing a story to recognize a poten
tially defamatory statement than one that would cause his subject
465. 419 U.S. at 250. This should not have been surprising since the trial was
held before Gertz was announced and the Rosenbloom plurality opinion was still ac
ceptable even in defamation cases.
466. ld. at 252-55.
467. ld. at 250; cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (the states
are not bound by the actual malice test but may define for themselves the appropri
ate standard of liability for defamation of private individuals).
468. See text accompanying notes 383 & 385 supra.
469. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945).
470. For example, the focus of the Cantrell false light case was on the outrage,
shame, mental distress and humiliation suffered by the family. 419 U.S. at 248. In
distinguishing false light invasion of privacy cases from right of publicity cases, how
ever, the Court has said that the interest protected in the former is clearly that of
reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation. Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1978). But if the interests to be
protected are the same, one must wonder why separate torts are recognized.
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to suffer inward humiliation. The Warren Court acknowledged this
in Hill. Requiring certainty about nondefamatory facts, the Court
contended, would saddle the press with an impossible burden and
would seriously impair our free press because the words carry no
warning that they are potentially harmfu1. 471 The Warren Court
thus stressed in Hill that the actual malice test was being applied
to false light privacy cases upon consideration of the factors
comprising such privacy cases, not through blind adherence to
Sullivan. 472

B.

Publication of Matters of Public Record

The Burger Court's second major privacy decision, in Cox, 473
involved an entirely different question. Cox concerned the disclo
sure of private facts during a telecast in which the identity of a
rape and murder victim, the plaintiff's daughter, was published.
The plaintiff sued the television station for invasion of privacy un
der a Georgia statute474 which makes it a misdemeanor to publish
or broadcast the name of a rape victim. The station's reporter had
learned the victim's identity by examining indictments of the al
leged assailants made available for his inspection in the courtroom
during preliminary hearings on the case. 475 There was no dispute
that the victim's identity appeared in the indictments or that the
indictments were public records available for inspections. 476
The Court did not use Cox as a forum for deciding a question
left open by Hill, that is, whether truthful publication of private
matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally pro
scribed. 477 Instead, it viewed Cox as presenting the much nar
rower question of whether a state could impose sanctions on the
accurate reporting of the name of a rape victim which was a matter
of public record. 478 The Court concluded that the state may not
impose such sanctions. It appeared to extend the Cox decision to
public records in general, stating that publication of public records
471. 385 u.s. at 389.
472. [d. at 390.
473. 420 U.S. at 469.
474. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
475. The hearings took place some eight months after the crime. Despite exten
sive press coverage of the crime the identity of the victim had not been disclosed
pending trial. 420 U.S. at 471.
476. [d. at 472-73.
477. [d. at 491.
478. [d.
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cannot be forbidden because the subject's sensibilities might be of
fended. 479
The Court premised its decision on two basic factors. First,
the state must have determined that the public interest was being
served by placing the information in the public domain. 48o Second,
individual citizens must necessarily rely upon the press to bring to
them in convenient form the facts of the operations of govern
ment. 481 The Court summarized that freedom of the press to pub
lish information contained in public records is of critical importance
to our type of government in which the citizenry judges the propri
ety of the conduct of public business. 482
The issue not addressed in Cox was the entitlement of the me
dia to access to public records. The Cox majority hinted, however,
that states wishing to protect privacy interests in judicial proceed
ings may do so by avoiding public documentation of private infor
mation. 483 The Court, though, expressly disclaimed any implication
that it had considered the constitutional questions behind state pol
icies prohibiting access by the public and press to various kinds of
official records. 484 The Cox decision was by its terms limited to
cases in which the state had placed the disputed information in the
public domain. Since Cox, the Burger Court has held that the pub
lic's right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute, that
the press has no right to information about a trial superior to that
of the public, and that custodians of judicial records may exercise
an "informed discretion" in deciding which records to release to
the public. 485
Cox did raise an additional, unanticipated issue. In discussing
the tort of invasion of privacy, Justice White, writing for the major
ity, said that the Court had left open the question of whether the
Constitution mandates that truth be recognized as a defense in a
defamation action brought by a private person. 486 Justice Powell,
concurring in the Cox result, felt that the Gertz requirement of
479. Id. at 495-96.
480. Id. at 495.
481. Id. at 491.
482. Id. at 495.
483. Id. at 496.
484. Id. at 496 n.26.
485. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 603 (1978) (White
House tapes in court custody). Cox was found to be inapplicable because the records
sought by the media in Nixon were not available to the general public. Id. at 608.
486. 420 U.S. at 490.
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fault in private figure plaintiff cases was dispositive of the issue
since the standard could not be satisfied unless the statements
were false. 487 Truth, therefore, could be a defense. Justice Powell's
logic seems impeccable, but further developments from the Court
are required to determine if a real issue exists as to whether truth
can be a defense. 488

C.

The Proprietary Right of Publicity

Ironically, the subspecies of the right of privacy receiving the
closest examination by the Supreme Court is the one most recently
developed, the proprietary right of publicity. While most commen
tators tend to class an invasion of the right of publicity as a form of
misappropriation,489 the two are not necessarily synonymous.
The classic misappropriation case is Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co. ,490 which involved the use of the plaintiffs like
ness on flour boxes and advertisements. The plaintiff was simply a
very pretty girl whose pleasing looks, the defendants evidently
thought, would help sell the flour poxes on which her face ap
peared. She was not a famous persot., and there was no commer
cial value in implying that she endorsed the product. The plaintiff
sued because she felt humiliated and distressed. Though she lost
the suit because the New York Court of Appeals in 1902 was un
willing to recognize the tort of invasion of privacy, the decision led
to the enactment of a statute prohibiting the unauthorized use of a
person's likeness or name "for advertising purposes, or for the pur
poses of trade."491 Thus, the tort of invasion of privacy by misap
propriation was born in New York.
Roberson involved a private plaintiff humiliated by having her
picture plastered over flour boxes and posters. Invasion of the pro
prietary right of publicity involves something a little different.
While triggered by the unauthorized use of a person's name or
likeness, right of publicity plaintiffs are not private persons who
487. Id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring).
488. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result without opinion. Justice
Douglas concurred, saying the government has no power to suppress "news of the
day." Id. at SOl. Justice Rehnquist dissented on procedural grounds. Justice
Rehnquist argued that, no final judgment having been appealed from, the Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at S02-12. The majority had concluded other
wise. Id. at 47S-87.
489. See, e.g., J. BA~ON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND
FREE PRESS § 7:8, at 72 (1979).
490. 171 N.Y. S38, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
491. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ SO, SI (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1979).
0
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simply want to be left alone. On the contrary, they are public fig
ures who have exploited their names and likenesses for their own
commercial purposes and do not want others to capitalize on their
notoriety without paying them for the privilege. Another difference
is that the interests protected by misappropriation generally do not
survive the plaintiff,492 but in some jurisdictions, heirs and assign
ees may sue to enforce the right of publicity even after the death
of the celebrity. 493
The Burger Court examined the right of publicity in Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting CO.494 The plaintiff had a fifteen
second "human cannonball" act that was filmed by a television sta
tion and was broadcast on the local news in the community where
the plaintiff was performing. Suing the station for unlawful appro
priation of professional property,495 the plaintiff complained that
the unauthorized publication of his act damaged him commercially.
The majority of the Ohio Supreme Court felt constitutionally con
strained by Hill to rule against the plaintiff. The Burger Court,
however, distinguished Hill as involving an entirely different tort
from the right of publicity which was at issue in Zacchini. 496
The interest protected in false light cases differs from that as
serted in right of publicity cases. False light cases concern the
plaintiff's mental distress, but right of publicity actions focus on the
right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors, being
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law. 497 Another dis
tinction is that false light causes of action seek to minimize the
publication of information to the public. Right of publicity plain
tiffs, on the contrary, do not object to widespread publication as
long as they get the commercial benefit of such publication. 498
The majority, in an opinion written by Justice White, saw no
constitutional impediment to enforcing the plaintiff's right of pub
licity, even against the news media. Justice White equated broad
casting a performer's entire act without his consent with broad
casting a copyrighted dramatic work without compensating the
492. The New York Civil Rights Law, for example, is limited by its terms to the
misappropriation of the names and likenesses of "living person(s)." Id. see Lombardo
v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977).
493. See, e.g., Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978)
(assignee of Elvis Presley's "transferable property right" of publicity).
494. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
495. Id. at 564.
496. Id.at 57l.
497. Id. at 573.
498. Id.
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owner. He found nothing in the Constitution that could prevent
states from requiring media defendants to pay plaintiffs for
transmitting their entire act to the public. 499 Justice Powell's dis
sent, which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, expressed doubt
that the language "a performer's entire . act" provided a clear
enough standard for resolution of this case: 500 He concluded, in
any event, that the use of the film was undeniably for news pur
poses and, therefore, was constitutionally privileged.
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that if the
United States Constitution did not protect the media here, neither
did the Ohio Constitution; and the court remanded the case for
trial. 501

VII.

CONCLUSION

The great expansion of press rights and privileges under the
Warren Court has been followed by the Burger Court's constriction
of journalists' constitutional perquisites. A clue to the reasons be
hind the curtailment of press rights is in Chief Justice Burger's
concurring opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti,502 a case os
tensibly not involving press freedoms.
In Bellotti, a five-justice majority overturned a Massachusetts
statute prohibiting business corporations from spending money to
influence votes on referenda unless the issue materially affected
the business or assets of the corporation. 503 In support of the stat
ute, Massachusetts argued, inter alia, that it was necessary to pre
serve the integrity of the electoral process and the individual
citizen's confidence in government. It reasoned that without re
strictions on spending, corporations might "drown out other points
of view. "504 The majority rejected this argument as being
unsupported either by the record or by the authorities. 505
In his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice expressed concern
that Massachusetts' argument, if taken to its logical extreme, might
jeopardize the First Amendment rights of the mass communica
499. Id. at 574-75.
500. Id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justices Powell,
Brennan and Marshall dissented on substantive grounds. Justice Stevens dissented
on procedural grounds.
501. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 286, 376
N.E.2d 582 (1978).
502. 435 U.S. 765 (1979).
503. Id. at 784.
504. Id. at 787.
505. Id. at 789-90.
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tions businesses, particularly the large media conglomerates who
do business in the corporate form. 506 This was so, he asserted, be
cause of the difficulty of distinguishing, in fact and in law, between
media corporations and others conducting business in the corporate
form. The thrust of Chief Justice Burger's argument was that there
was no distinction between the First Amendment rights of media
corporations and those of other corporate entities. In so finding,
the Chief Justice was simply reasserting his position in the host of
cases in which he had declared that the press had no greater rights
than the public to gather or to disseminate information. He has
consistently rejected the theory that the press, under the First
Amendment, has a special role to play in the constitutional
scheme.
More revealing about this particular opinion, however, is the
Chief Justice's portrayal of the media. He referred to the "vast
wealth and power" amassed by some media enterprises and sug
gested that such media conglomerates pose a much more realistic
threat than business corporations which generally are not con
cerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues. 507 He re
peated his finding in Tornillo that modem media empires place the
power to shape public opinion and to influence the American peo
ple in the hands of very few. 508
It is entirely possible to read too much into the Bellotti opin
ion, but it is equally possible that the Chief Justice revealed an at
titude toward the media that has colored his view of all first
Amendment issues to reach his Court. Whether the other Justices
who have more or less consistently voted to restrict press rights
share this attitude is highly conjectural. It is a question worthy of
some study.
The Chief Justice and a majority of his Court have clearly re
jected the notion that the press has a special constitutional role
which cannot be carried out without special rights and privileges.
Government secrecy is immune from media investigations while
press secrecy does not enjoy similar immunity from government
probing. The media may publish what they learn, but they have no
constitutional right to be educated. It is in this framework that
journalists must now do their job. It can only be hoped that they
can rise to the task.
506. Id. at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
507. Id.
508. Id.

